A Permission-Dependent Type System for Secure Information Flow Analysis by Chen, Hongxu et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
09
62
3v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  2
7 S
ep
 20
17
1
A Permission-Dependent Type System for Secure Information Flow
Analysis
HONGXU CHEN, Nanyang Technological University
ALWEN TIU, Nanyang Technological University and e Australian National University
ZHIWU XU, Shenzhen University
YANG LIU, Nanyang Technological University
We introduce a novel type system for enforcing secure information flow in an imperative language. Our work
is motivated by the problem of statically checking potential information leakage in Android applications. To
this end, we design a lightweight type system featuring Android permission model, where the permissions
are statically assigned to applications and are used to enforce access control in the applications. We take
inspiration from a type system by Banerjee and Naumann (BN) to allow security types to be dependent
on the permissions of the applications. A novel feature of our type system is a typing rule for conditional
branching induced by permission testing, which introduces a merging operator on security types, allowing
more precise security policies to be enforced. e soundness of our type system is proved with respect to a
notion of noninterference. In addition, a type inference algorithm is presented for the underlying security
type system, by reducing the inference problem to a constraint solving problem in the laice of security types.
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1 INTRODUCTION
is work is motivated by the problem of securing information flow in Android applications (apps
for short). We follow the language-based security approach whereby information flow is enforced
through type systems [8, 9, 29, 34]. In particular, we propose a design of a type system that guar-
antees noninterference property [34], i.e., typable programs are noninterferent. As shown in [14],
noninterference provides a general and natural way to model information flow security. noninter-
ference e type-based approach to noninterference typically requires assigning security labels
to program variables and security policies to functions or procedures. Such policies are typically
encoded as types, and typeability of the program implies that the runtime behaviour of the pro-
gram complies with the stated policies (types). Security labels form a laice structure with an
underlying partial order ≤, e.g., a laice with two elements “high” (H ) and “low” (L) with L ≤ H .
Typing rules can then be designed to prevent both explicit flow from H to L, and implicit flow
through conditionals (e.g., if-then-else statement). To prevent an explicit flow, the typing rule for
an assignment statement such as x := e would require that l(e) ≤ l(x) where l(.) denotes the
security level of an expression. To prevent an implicit flow through conditionals, e.g., if (y =
0) then x:= 0 else x := 1, most type systems for noninterference require that the condition
(y = 0) and the assignments in both branches are given the same security level. For example, if y
is of type H and x is of type L, the statement would not be typable.
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1.1 Motivating Example
In designing an information flow type system for Android, we encounter a common paern of
conditionals that would not be typable using the conventional type system. Consider the following
pseudo-code:
S t r i n g ge tContac tNo ( S t r i n g name ) {
S t r i n g number ;
i f ( ch e ckPe rmi s s i on (READ CONTACT ) )
number = . . . ;
e l se number = ” ” ;
return number ;
}
Such a code fragment could be part of a phone dialer app or a contact provider, where the function
getContactNoprovides a public interface to query the phone number associated with a name. e
(implicit) security policy in this context is that contact information (the phone number) can only
be released if the calling app possesses the required permission (READ CONTACT). e laer
is enforced using the checkPermission API in Android. Suppose phone numbers are labelled
with H , and the empty string is labelled with L. If the interface is invoked by an app that has the
required permission, the phone number (H ) is returned; otherwise the empty string (L) is returned.
In either case, there is no leakage of information: in the former case, the calling app can access
the phone number directly anyway; and in the laer case, no phone numbers are returned. So
by this informal reasoning, the function complies with the implicit security policy and it should
be safe to be called in any context, whether or not the calling app has the required permission.
However, in the traditional (non-value dependent) typing rule for the if-then-else construct, one
would need to assign the same security level to both branches, which would result in the return
value of the function to be assigned the security levelH . As a consequence, if this function is called
from an app with no permission, and if the return value of the function is assigned to a variable
with security level L, it would be considered a potential direct flow, even though there is actually
no information being leaked. To cater for such a scenario, we need to make the security type of
getContactNo depend on the permissions possessed by the caller.
Banerjee and Naumann [2] proposed a type system (which we shall refer to as the BN type
system) that incorporates permissions into function types. eir type system was designed for an
access control mechanism different from Android’s permission based mechanism, but the basic
principles are still applicable. In their system, permissions are associated with a Java class and
need to be explicitly enabled for them to have any effect. Depending on permissions of the calling
app, a function such as getContactNo can have a collection of types. In BN type system, the types
of a function take the form (l1, . . . , ln)
P
−−→ l where l1, . . . , ln denote the security levels of the
input to the function, l denotes the security level of the output and P denotes a set of permissions
that are not enabled by the caller. e underlying idea in their type system is that permissions
are treated as guards to sensitive values, thus conservatively, one would type the return value of
getContactNo as L only if one knows that the permission READ CONTACT is not enabled. e
following represents a collection of types for getContactNo in BN system
дetContactNo : L
P
−−→ L дetContactNo : L
∅
−−→ H
where P = {READ CONTACT}. When typing a function call to getContactNo by an app without
permissions, the first type of getContactNowill be used; otherwise the second type will be used.
In BN type system, the typing judgment is parameterized by a permission set P containing the
permissions that are not enabled. eir language has a command called test which checks the
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presence of a permission set. at is, “test(P) c1 else c2” means that if permissions in set P are all
enabled, then the command behaves like c1; otherwise it behaves like c2. Roughly, the typing rules
for the test command (in a much simplified form) are:
R1
Q ∩ P = ∅ Q ⊢ c1 : τ Q ⊢ c2 : τ
Q ⊢ test(P) c1 else c2 : τ
R2
Q ∩ P , ∅ Q ⊢ c2 : τ
Q ⊢ test(P) c1 else c2 : τ
where Q refers to the permissions that are not enabled. When Q ∩ P , ∅, that means at least one
of the permissions in P is not enabled, thus one can determine statically that only the else branch
is relevant. is case is reflected in the typing rule R2. When Q ∩ P = ∅, it could be that all
permissions in P are enabled, or it could mean that some permissions in P are not granted to the
class. So in this case, one cannot determine statically which branch of the test will be taken at
runtime. e typing rule R1 therefore conservatively considers typing both branches.
When adapting BN type system to Android, we found that in some scenarios R1 is too strong,
especially when it is desired that the absence of some permissions leads to the release of sensitive
values. Consider for example an application that provides location tracking information related
to a certain advertising ID. e laer provides a unique ID for the purpose of anonymizing mobile
users to be used for advertising (instead of relying on hardware device IDs such as IMEI num-
bers). If one can correlate an advertising ID with a unique hardware ID, it will defeat the purpose
of the anonymizing service provided by the advertising ID. To prevent that, the following func-
tion getInfo returns the location information for an advertising ID only if the caller does not have
access to device ID. To simplify discussion, let us assume that the permissions to access IMEI and
location information are denoted by p and q, respectively.
S t r i n g g e t I n f o ( ) {
S t r i n g r = ” ” ;
t e s t ( p ) {
t e s t ( q ) r = l o c ; e l se r = ” ” ;
} e l se {
t e s t ( q ) r = i d ++ l o c ; e l se r = ” ” ;
}
return r ;
}
Here id denotes a unique advertising ID (rather than IMEI) generated and stored by the app for the
purpose of anonymizing user tracking; loc denotes location information. e function first tests
whether the caller has access to IMEI number. If it does, and if it has access to location, then only
the location information is returned. If the caller has no access to IMEI number, but can access
location information, then the combination of advertising id and location id++loc is returned. In
all the other cases, a empty string is returned. Let us consider a laice with four elements ordered
as: L ≤ l1, l2 ≤ H , where l1 and l2 are incomparable. Suppose we specify that empty string (“”) is
of type L, loc is of type l1, id is of type l2, and the aggregate id++loc is of type H . Consider the
case where the caller has both permissions p and q and both are enabled initially. When applying
BN type system, the desired type of getInfo in this case is ()
∅
−−→ l1. is means that the type
of r has to be at most l1. Since no permissions are not explicitly enabled, only R1 is applicable to
type this program. is, however, will force both branches of test(p) to have the same type (i.e.,
security level). As a result, r has to be typed as H so that all four assignments in the program can
be typed.
e issue with the example above is that the stated security policy is non-monotonic in the
permission set of the calling app. at is, an app with more permissions does not necessarily have
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:4 Hongxu Chen, Alwen Tiu, Zhiwu Xu, and Yang Liu
access to information with higher level of security compared to an app with fewer permissions.
e fact that the BN type system cannot precisely capture the desired policy stated above appears
to be a design decision on their part; we quote from [2]:
”On the other hand, one can envision a kind of dual to the design paern we con-
sider: A method may release H information just if a certain permission is absent.
Our analysis does not handle this paern and we are unaware of motivating ex-
amples; permission checks usually guard sensitive actions such as the release of
H information. A tempting idea is to downgrade or declassify information in the
presence of certain permissions. But declassification violates noninterference and
it is an open problem what is a good information flow property in the presence of
declassification”
As we have seen in the above example, non-monotonic policies can arise quite naturally in the
seing of mobile applications. In general, non-monotonic policies may be required to solve the
aggregation problem studied in the information flow theory [16], where several pieces of low secu-
rity level information may be pooled together to learn information at a higher security level.
We adopt the basic idea from BN type system for relating permissions and security types, to
design a more precise type system for information flow under an access control model inspired
by Android framework. Our type system solves the problem of typing non-monotonic policies
such as the one described above, without resorting to downgrading or declassifying information
as suggested in [2]. is is done technically via a new operator on security types, which we call
merging, to keep information related to both branches of a test. is in turn requires a significant
revision of the soundness proof for our type system. Additionally, there is a significant differ-
ence in the permission model used in BN type system, where permissions may be propagated
across method invocations, and the permission model we use here, which is based on Android
permission mechanism. Essentially, permissions are relevant in Android only during inter-apps
or inter-components calls, which we model here as remote procedure calls. More importantly,
permissions are not tracked along the call chains. As we shall see in Section 2, this may create a
potential aack via “parameter laundering” and the design of the typing rule for remote procedure
call needs special aention.
1.2 Contributions
e contributions of our work are three-fold.
(1) We develop a lightweight type system in which security types are functions from permis-
sions to a laice of security levels, and prove its soundness with respect to a notion of
noninterference (Sec. 2). It allows us to precisely model information flow that depends
on security policies, including those that are non-monotonic in terms of permission set
containment.
(2) We present a novel approach to model the permission checking mechanism in Android
(Sec. 2 & Sec. 3) which requires a different approach in typing (remote) function calls.
(3) We propose a decidable inference algorithm by reducing type inference to a constraint
solving problem and applying an efficient algorithm to solve it (Sec. 3), which is useful in
recovering precise security types (such as the getInfo case above).
Due to space constraints, detailed proofs of some lemmas and theorems are omied, but they
are available in the supplementary material provided along with this submission.
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2 A SECURE INFORMATION FLOW TYPE SYSTEM
In this section, we present a simple imperative language featuring function calls and permission
checks. We first discuss informally a permission-based access control model we consider, which
is an abstraction of the permission mechanism used in Android. We then give the operational
semantics of a simple imperative language that includes permission checking constructs based on
the abstract permission model described in Section 2.1. In Section 2.4 we provide the type system
for our imperative language and prove its soundness with respect to a notion of noninterference.
e detailed definitions and proofs of this section can be found at Appx. A.
2.1 A model of permission-based access control
eAndroid framework has a large and complicated code base, which we will not be able to model
completely. Instead we focus on the permission model used in inter process or inter component
communication in Android. Such permissions are used to regulate access to protected resources,
such as device id, location information, contact information, etc. As mentioned in Sec. 1, the moti-
vation is to design an information flow type system incorporating some access control mechanisms
in Android, where access to data and system services may be associated with permissions.
An app specifies the permissions it needs at installation time, via a meta-file called the manifest
file. In recent versions of Android, since version 6.0, some of these permissions need to be con-
firmed at runtime. But at no point a permission request is allowed if it is not already specified in
the manifest. For now, we assume a permission enforcement mechanism that applies to Android
prior to version 6.0, so it does not account for permission granting at runtime. is will have a
consequence in terms of noninterference for non-monotonic policies (i.e, those policies that link
the absence of certain permissions to “high” security levels, such as the example we presented in
the introduction). We shall come back to this point later in Section 6.
An Android app may provide services to other apps, or other components within itself. Such a
service provider may impose permissions on other apps who want to access its services. Commu-
nication between apps are implemented through the Binder IPC (interprocess communications)
mechanism [10]. In our model, a program can be seen as a very much simplified version of a
service application in Android, and the main intention here is to show how one can reason about
information flow in such a service provider when access control is imposed on the calling appli-
cation. In the following we shall not model explicitly the IPC mechanism of Android, but will
instead abstract it into a (remote) function call. Note that this abstraction is practical since it can
be achieved by conventional data and control flow analysis, together with the modeling of An-
droid IPC specific APIs. And this has been implemented by existing static analysis frameworks
like FlowDroid [1], Amandroid [36], IccTA[17], etc 1.
Android framework does not track the IPC call chains between apps and permissions of an app
are not propagated when a remote procedure is called. An app A calling another app B does not
grant B the permissions assigned to A.is is different from the BN type systemwhere permissions
can potentially propagate along the call stacks. Note however that B can potentially have more
permissions than A, leading to a potential privilege escalation, which is a known weakness in
Android permission system [7]. Another consequence of this lack of transitivity is that in designing
the type system, one must be careful to avoid what we call a ”parameter laundering” aack (see
Section 2.4).
1In fact, we are also implementing a permission-dependent information flow analysis tool on top of Amandroid. e
fundamental idea is similar to the one mentioned here, however the focus is improving the precision of information leakage
detection rather than noninterference certification.
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Access to resources in Android are guarded by a set of permissions. In most of the cases, at most
one permission is needed for each access (for system resources), but individual apps may imple-
ment custom permissions and may require the presence or absence of one or more permissions.
A (system) resource can be accessed through different API calls. We assume that these API calls
are implemented correctly and the permissions required are enforced consistently (note that this
is not necessarily the case with Android, as the study in [30] has shown). Some API calls may
require less permissions than others though they allow access to the same resource. In principle,
our typing system can be applied to type check the entire framework, but this is not practical. In
practice, one needs to make simplifying assumptions about the enforcement of the permissions in
the framework.
2.2 An Imperative Language with Permission Checks
We do not model directly the Android (mostly Java) source code but a much simplified language,
which is a variant of the imperative language considered in [34], extended with functions and an
operator for permission checks.
We model an app as a collection of functions (services), together with a statically assigned per-
mission set; a system, denoted as S, consists of a set of apps. We use capital leers A,B, . . . to
denote apps. A function f defined in an app A is abbreviated to A. f , and may be called indepen-
dently of other functions in the same app. e intention is that a function models an application
component (i.e., Activity, Service, BroadCastReceiver, or ContentProvider) in Android, which may
be called fromwithin the same app or from other apps. We assume that at any given time only one
function is executed, so we do not model concurrent executions of apps. Additionally, functions
in a system are assumed to be not (mutually) recursive, so in a given system, there is a finite chain
of function calls from any given function. Each app is assigned a static set of permissions, drawn
from a finite set of permissions P. e powerset of P is wrien asP.
For simplicity, we consider only programs manipulating integers, so the expressions in our lan-
guage all have the integer type. Boolean values are encoded as zero (false) and nonzero (true). e
grammar for expressions is thus as follows:
e ::= n | x | e op e
where n denotes an integer literal, x denotes a variable, and e op e denotes a binary operation. e
commands of the language are given in the following grammar:
c ::= x := e | if e then c else c | while e do c | c; c
| letvar x = e in c | x := call A. f (e) | test(p) c else c
e first four constructs are respectively assignment, conditional, while-loop and sequential com-
position. e statement “letvar x = e in c” is a local variable declaration statement. Here x is
declared and initialized to e , and its scope is the command c . We require that x does not occur in
e . e statement “x := callA. f (e)” denotes an assignment whose right hand side is a function call
toA. f . “test(p) c1 else c2” checks whether the calling app has permission p: if it does then c1 is ex-
ecuted, otherwise c2 is executed. is is similar to the test construct in BN’s paper. But unlike the
test construct in their language, where test can be done on a set of permissions, we allow testing
only one permission at a time. is is the typical practice in Android [11]. And it is not a restriction
in theory, since we can use nested permission checks to simulate BN’s test behavior.
A function declaration has the following syntax:
F ::= A. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
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where A. f is the name of the function, x¯ are function parameters, “init r = 0 in {c; return r}” is
the function body, where c is a command and r is a local variable that holds the return value of the
function. e variables x and r are bound variables with the command c; return r in their scopes.
We consider only closed functions, i.e., the variables occurring in c are either introduced by letvar
or from the set {x , r }. To simplify proofs of various properties, we assume that bound variables
are named differently so there are no naming clashes between them in a system.
E-VAL
η ⊢ v { v
E-VAR
η ⊢ x { η(x)
E-OP
η ⊢ e1 { v1 η ⊢ e2 { v2
η ⊢ e1 op e2 { v1 op v2
E-ASS
η ⊢ e { v
η;A; P ⊢ x := e { η[x 7→ v]
E-IF-T
η ⊢ e { v v , 0 η;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′
η;A; P ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 { η
′
E-IF-F
η ⊢ e { v v = 0 η;A; P ⊢ c2 { η
′
η;A; P ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 { η
′
E-WHILE-T
η ⊢ e { v v , 0 η;A; P ⊢ c { η′
η′;A; P ⊢ while e do c { η′′
η;A; P ⊢ while e do c { η′′
E-WHILE-F
η ⊢ e { v v = 0
η;A; P ⊢ while e do c { η
E-SEQ
η;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′ η′;A; P ⊢ c2 { η
′′
η;A; P ⊢ c1; c2 { η
′′
E-LETVAR
η ⊢ e { v η[x 7→ v];A; P ⊢ c { η′
η;A; P ⊢ letvar x = e in c { η′ − x
E-CP-T
p ∈ P η;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′
η;A; P ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 { η
′
E-CP-F
p < P η;A; P ⊢ c2 { η
′
η;A; P ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 { η
′
E-CALL
FD(B. f ) = B. f (y)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
η ⊢ e { v [y 7→ v, r 7→ 0];B;Θ(A) ⊢ c { η′
η;A; P ⊢ x := call B. f (e){ η[x 7→ η′(r )]
Fig. 1. Evaluation rules for expressions and commands, given a function definition table FD and a permission
assignment Θ.
2.3 Operational Semantics
We assume that function definitions in a system are stored in a table FD indexed by function names,
and the permission set assigned to a certain app is given by a table Θ indexed by app names.
An evaluation environment is a finite mapping from variables to values (i.e., integers). We denote
with EEnv the set of evaluation environments. Elements of EEnv are ranged over by η. We also
use the notation [x1 7→ v1, · · · , xn 7→ vn] to denote an evaluation environment mapping variable
xi to value vi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}; this will sometimes be abbreviated as [x 7→ v]. e domain of
η = [x1 7→ v1, · · · , xn 7→ vn] (i.e., {x1, . . . , xn}) is wrien as dom(η). Given two environments
η1 and η2, we define η1η2 as an environment η such that η(x) = η2(x) if x ∈ dom(η2), otherwise
η(x) = η1(x). For example, η[x 7→ v] maps x to v , and y to η(y) for any y ∈ dom(η) such that
y , x . Given a mapping η and a variable x , we write η−x to denote the mapping by removing x
from dom(η).
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e semantics of expressions and commands are defined via the evaluation rules in Fig. 1. e
semantics of a function will be implicitly defined in function calls. e evaluation judgment for
expressions has the form η ⊢ e { v , which states that expression e evaluates to value v when
variables in e are interpreted in the evaluation environment η. We write η ⊢ e { v , where e =
e1, . . . , en and v = v1, . . . ,vn for some n, to denote a sequence of judgments η ⊢ e1 { v1, . . . ,η ⊢
en { vn .
e evaluation judgment for commands takes the form η;A; P ⊢ c { η′ where η is an evaluation
environment before the execution of the command c , and η′ is the evaluation environment aer
the execution of c . e permission set P denotes the permissions of the caller of command, and A
refers to the app to which the command c belongs.
e operational semantics of most commands are straightforward. We explain the semantics
of the test primitive and the function call. Rules (E-CP-T) and (E-CP-F) capture the semantics of
the test primitive. ese are where the permission P in the evaluation judgement is used. e
semantics of function calls is given by (E-CALL). Notice that c inside the body of callee is executed
under the permission of A, i.e., Θ(A). e permission P in the conclusion of that rule is not used
in the premise. at is, permissions of the caller of app A are not transferred over to the callee
function B. f . is reflects the way permissions in Android are passed on during IPCs [10, 11], and
is also a major difference between our handling of permissions and BN’s, where permissions are
inherited by successive function calls.
2.4 Security Types
In information flow type systems such as [34], it is common to adopt a laice structure to encode
security levels. Security types in this seing are just security levels. In our case, we generalize the
security types to account for the dependency of security levels on permissions. So we shall distin-
guish security levels, given by a laice structure which encodes sensitivity levels of information,
and security types, which are mappings from permissions to security levels. We assume the se-
curity levels are given by a laice L , with a partial order ≤L . Security types are defined in the
following.
Definition 2.1. A base security type (or base type) t is a mapping fromP to L . We denote with
T the set of base types. Given two base types s, t , we say s = t iff s(P) = t(P) ∀ P ∈P and s ≤T t
iff ∀ P ∈P, s(P) ≤L t(P).
As we shall see, if a variable is typed by a base type, the sensitivity of its content may depend
on the permissions of the app which writes to the variable. In contrast, in traditional information
flow type systems, a variable annotated with a security level has a fixed sensitivity level regardless
of the permissions of the app who writes to the variable.
A security level l can also be treated as a special base type tl that is a constant function, mapping
all permission sets to level l itself. erefore, we define an embedding function ·ˆ from security levels
to base types, such that lˆ = tl . is means that, given a security level l , we have lˆ(P) = l ,∀P ∈P.
Next, we show that the set of base types with the order ≤T forms a laice.
Lemma 2.2. ≤T is a partial order relation on T .
Definition 2.3. For s, t ∈ T , s ⊔ t and s ⊓ t are defined as
(s ⊔ t)(P) = s(P) ⊔ t(P),∀P ∈P
(s ⊓ t)(P) = s(P) ⊓ t(P),∀P ∈P
Lemma 2.4. (T , ≤T) forms a laice.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
A Permission-Dependent Type System for Secure Information Flow Analysis 1:9
From now on, we shall drop the subscripts in ≤L and ≤T when no ambiguity arises.
Definition 2.5. A function type has the form t → t , where t = (t1, . . . , tm),m ≥ 0 and t are base
types. e types t are the types for the arguments of the function and t is the return type of the
function.
In the type system that we shall define later, security types of variables and expressions may be
altered depending on the execution context. at is, when a variable is used in a context where
a permission check has been performed (either successfully or unsuccessfully), the type of the
variable may be adjusted to take into account the presence or absence of the checked permission.
Such an adjustment is called a promotion or a demotion.
Definition 2.6. Given a permission p, the promotion and demotion of a base type t with respect
to p are:
(t ↑p )(P) = t(P ∪ {p}),∀P ∈P (promotion)
(t ↓p )(P) = t(P \ {p}),∀P ∈P (demotion)
e promotion and demotion of a function type t → t , where t = (t1, . . . , tm), are respectively:
(t → t) ↑p= t ↑p→ t ↑p , where t ↑p= (t1 ↑p , . . . , tm ↑p ),
(t → t) ↓p= t ↓p→ t ↓p , where t ↓p= (t1 ↓p , . . . , tm ↓p ).
2.5 Security Type System
We first define a couple of operations on security types and permissions that will be used later.
Definition 2.7. Given t ∈ T and P ∈P, the projection of t on P is a security type πP (t) defined
as follows:
πP (t)(Q) = t(P), ∀Q ∈P.
Type projection of a list of types on P is then wrien as
πP ((t1, . . . , tn)) = (πP (t1), . . . , πP (tn)).
Definition 2.8. Given a permission p and types t1 and t2, themerging of t1 and t2 alongp, denoted
as t1 ⊲p t2, is:
(t1 ⊲p t2)(P) =
{
t1(P) p ∈ P
t2(P) p < P
∀P ∈P
A typing environment is a finite mapping from variables to base types. We use the notation
[x1 : t1, . . . , xn : tn] to enumerate a typing environment with domain {x1, . . . , xn}. Typing envi-
ronments are ranged over by Γ. Given Γ1 and Γ2 such that dom(Γ1) ∩ dom(Γ2) = ∅, we write Γ1Γ2 to
denote a typing environment that is the (disjoint) union of the mappings in Γ1 and Γ2.
Definition 2.9. Given a typing environment Γ, its promotion and demotion along p are typing
environments Γ ↑p and Γ ↓p , such that (Γ ↑p )(x) = Γ(x) ↑p and (Γ ↓p )(x) = Γ(x) ↓p for every
x ∈ dom(Γ). e projection of Γ on P ∈P is a typing environment πP (Γ) such that (πP (Γ))(x) =
πP (Γ(x)) for each x ∈ dom(Γ).
ere are three typing judgments in our type system as explained below. All these judgments are
implicitly parameterized by a function type table, FT , which maps all function names to function
types, and a mapping Θ assigning permission sets to apps.
• Expression typing: Γ ⊢ e : t . is says that under Γ, the expression e has a base type at
most t .
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• Command typing: Γ;A ⊢ c : t . is means that the command c writes to variables with
type at least t , when executed by app A, under the typing environment Γ.
• Function typing: e typing judgment takes the form:
⊢ B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ t ′
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and t = (t1, . . . , tn) for some n ≥ 0. Functions in our seing are
polymorphic in the permissions of the caller. Intuitively, this means that each caller of the
function above with permission set P “sees” the function as having type πP (t) → πP (t
′).
at is, if the function is called from another app with permission P , then it expects input
of type at least πP (t) and a return value of type up to πP (t
′).
e typing rules are given in Fig. 2. Most of these rules are common to information flow type
systems [2, 29, 34], except for (T-CP) and (T-CALL), which we explain below.
In Rule (T-CP), to type statement test(p) c1 else c2, we need to type c1 in a promoted typing en-
vironment, to account for the case where the permission check for p succeeds, and c2 in a demoted
typing environment, to account for the case where the permission check fails. e challenge here
is then how one combines the types obtained in the two premises of the rule to obtain the type
for the conclusion. One possibility is to force the type of the two premises and the conclusion to
be identical to those in the conditional construct typing, i.e., Rule (T-IF). is, as we have seen in
Sec. 1, leads to a loss in precision of the type for the test statement. Instead, we consider a more
refined merged type t1 ⊲p t2 for the conclusion, where t1 (t2 resp.) is the type of the le (right
resp.) premise. To understand the intuition behind the merged type, consider a scenario where
the statement is executed in a context where permission p is present. en the permission check
succeeds and the statement test(p) c1 else c2 is equivalent to c1. In this case, one would expect
that the behaviour of test(p) c1 else c2 would be equivalent to that of c1. is is in fact captured
by the equation (t1 ⊲p t2)(P) = t1(P) for all P such that p ∈ P , which holds by definition. A dual
scenario arises when p is not in the permissions of the execution context.
In Rule (T-CALL), the callee function B. f is assumed to be typed checked already and its type is
given in the FT table. Here the function B. f is called by A so the type of B. f as seen by A should
be a projection of the type given in FT (B. f ) on the permissions of A (given by Θ(A)): πΘ(A)(t ) →
πΘ(A)(t
′). erefore the arguments for the function call should be typed as Γ ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(t) and the
return type (as viewed by A) should be dominated by the type of x , i.e., πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤ Γ(x).
It is essential that in Rule (T-CALL), the arguments e and the return value of the function call
are typed according to the projection of t and t ′ onΘ(A). If they are instead typed with t , then there
is a potential implicit flow via what we call a “parameter laundering” aack. To see why, consider
the following alternative formulation of (T-CALL):
T-CALL’
FT (B. f ) = t → t ′ Γ ⊢ e : t t ′ ≤ Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
Now consider the following functions:
A. f ( x ) {
i n i t r in {
r : = c a l l B . g ( x ) ;
return r
}
}
B . g ( x ) {
i n i t r in {
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t e s t ( p ) r : = 0 e l se r : = x ;
return r
}
}
C . g e t s e c r e t ( ) {
i n i t r in {
t e s t ( p ) r : = SECRET e l se r : = 0 ;
return r
}
}
M. main ( ) {
i n i t r in
l e tva r
(
r : = c a l l A . f (
) ;
return r
}
Let P = {p} and let t be the base type t = {∅ 7→ L, {p} 7→ H }, where L andH are boom and top
levels respectively. Here we assume the value SECRET is a “high” value that needs to be protected
so we require that the function C.getsecret to have type () → t . at is, only apps that have the
required permission p may obtain the secret value. Suppose the permissions assigned to the apps
are given by: Θ(A) = Θ(B) = ∅,Θ(C) = Θ(M) = {p}. If we were to adopt the modified T-CALL’
instead of T-CALL, then we can assign the following types to the above functions:
FT :=

A. f 7→ t → Lˆ
B.д 7→ t → Lˆ
C .дetsecret 7→ () → t
M .main 7→ () → Lˆ
Notice that the return type ofM .main is Lˆ despite having a return value that contains SECRET. If
we were to use T-CALL’ in place of T-CALL, the above functions can be typed as follows:
FT (B.д) = t → Lˆ x : t , r : Lˆ ⊢ x : t Lˆ ≤ t
T-CALL’
x : t , r : Lˆ;A ⊢ r := call B.д(x) : Lˆ
T-FUN
⊢ A. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {r := call B.д(x); return r }
}
: t → Lˆ
x : t ↑p , r : Lˆ ↑p⊢ r := 0 : Lˆ x : t ↓p , r : Lˆ ↓p⊢ r := x : Lˆ
T-CP
x : t , r : Lˆ ⊢ test(p) r := 0 else r := x : Lˆ ⊲p Lˆ
T-FUN
⊢ B.д(x)
{
init r = 0 in {test(p) r := 0 else r := x ; return r }
}
: t → Lˆ
Note that t ↑p= Hˆ and t ↓p= Lˆ = Lˆ ↓= Lˆ ↑ .
r : t ↑p⊢ r := SECRET : Hˆ r : t ↓p⊢ r := 0 : Lˆ
T-CP
r : t ⊢ test(p) r := SECRET else r := 0 : Hˆ ⊲p Lˆ
T-FUN
⊢ C .дetsecret ( )
{
init r = 0 in {test(p) r := SECRET else r := 0; return r }
}
: () → t
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Note that Hˆ ⊲p Lˆ = t .
Finally, still assuming T-CALL’, a partial typing derivation forM .main is as follows:
r : Lˆ ⊢ 0 : t
Γ;M ⊢ xH := call C .дetsecret ( ) : Lˆ Γ;M ⊢ r := call A. f (xH ) : Lˆ
T-SEQ
r : Lˆ, xH : t ;M ⊢ xH := callC .дetsecret ( ); r := call A. f (xH ) : Lˆ
T-LETVAR
r : Lˆ ;M ⊢ letvar xH = 0 in xH := call C .дetsecret ( ); r := call A. f (xH ) : Lˆ
T-FUN
⊢ M .main( ){init r = 0 in
letvar xH = 0 in{
xH := call C .дetsecret ( );
r := call A. f (xH )
}
return r }
: () → Lˆ
where Γ = {r : Lˆ, xH : t}. To finish this typing derivation, we need to complete the derivations for
the leaves:
FT (C .дetsecret) = () → t Γ ⊢ () : () t ≤ Γ(xH ) = t
T-CALL’
Γ;M ⊢ xH := call C .дetsecret ( ) : t
T-SUBc
Γ;M ⊢ xH := call C .дetsecret ( ) : Lˆ
FT (A. f ) = t → Lˆ Γ ⊢ xH : t Lˆ ≤ Γ(xH ) = t
T-CALL’
Γ;M ⊢ r := call A. f (xH ) : Lˆ
Since M .main returns a sensitive value, the typing rule T-CALL’ is obviously unsound. With
the correct typing rule for function calls, the function A. f cannot be assigned type t → Lˆ, since
that would require the instance of T-CALL (i.e., when making the call to B.д) in this case to satisfy
the constraint:
x : t , r : Lˆ ⊢ x : πΘ(A)(t)
where πΘ(A)(t) = Lˆ, which is impossible since t  Lˆ. What this means is essentially that in our
type system, information received by an app A from the parameters cannot be propagated by
A to another app B, unless A is already authorized to access the information contained in the
parameter. Note that this only restricts the propagation of such parameters to other apps; the app
A can process the information internally without necessarily violating the typing constraints.
Finally, the reader may check that if we fix the type of B.д to t → Lˆ thenA. f can only be assigned
type Lˆ → Lˆ. In no circumstances can M .main be typed, since the statement xH := C .дetsecret()
forces xH to have type Hˆ , and thus cannot be passed to A. f as an argument.
2.6 Noninterference and Soundness Proof
We now discuss a notion of noninterference and prove the soundness of our type system with
respect to it. Firstly we define an indistinguishability relation between evaluation environments.
Such a definition typically assumes an observer who may observe values of variables at a certain
security level. In the non-dependent seing, the security level of the observer is fixed, say at lO ,
and valuations of variables at level lO or below are required to be identical. In our seing, the
security level of a variable can vary depending on the permissions of the caller app of a particular
service, and the observer may itself be an app within the system. We do not assume a priori that
the policies assigned to functions and variables to agree with one another, e.g., it may be the case
that we have two variables x : t and y : t ′ such that t(P) , t ′(P) where P is the permission
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T-VAR
Γ ⊢ x : Γ(x)
T-OP
Γ ⊢ e1 : t Γ;A ⊢ e2 : t
Γ ⊢ e1 op e2 : t
T-SUBe
Γ ⊢ e : s s ≤ t
Γ ⊢ e : t
T-SUBc
Γ;A ⊢ c : s t ≤ s
Γ;A ⊢ c : t
T-ASS
Γ ⊢ e : Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := e : Γ(x)
T-LETVAR
Γ ⊢ e : s Γ[x : s];A ⊢ c : t
Γ;A ⊢ letvar x = e in c : t
T-IF
Γ ⊢ e : t Γ;A ⊢ c1 : t Γ;A ⊢ c2 : t
Γ;A ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 : t
T-CP
Γ ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1 Γ ↓p ;A ⊢ c2 : t2
Γ;A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : t1 ⊲p t2
T-WHILE
Γ ⊢ e : t Γ;A ⊢ c : t
Γ;A ⊢ while e do c : t
T-SEQ
Γ;A ⊢ c1 : t Γ;A ⊢ c2 : t
Γ;A ⊢ c1; c2 : t
T-CALL
FT (B. f ) = t → t ′ Γ ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(t) πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤ Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
T-FUN
[x : t , r : t ′];B ⊢ c : s
⊢ B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t → t ′
Fig. 2. Typing rules for expressions, commands and functions, given a function-type table FT and a permis-
sion assignment Θ.
set associated with the observer. So to be sound, our notion of indistinguishability needs to take
into account all the security levels assigned to permission set P by all variables. In effect, this is
equivalent to simply fixing the security level of the observer and ignoring the permission set P of
the observer. is leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.10. Given two evaluation environments η,η′, a typing environment Γ, a security
level lO ∈ L of the observer, indistinguishability relation is defined as follows:
η =
lO
Γ
η′ iff. ∀x ∈ dom(Γ).
(
Γ(x) ≤ lˆO ⇒ η(x) = η
′(x)
)
where η(x) = η′(x) holds iff both sides of the equation are defined and equal, or both sides are
undefined.
Notice that in Definition 2.10, since base types are functions from permissions to security level,
the security level lO needs to be lied to a base type in the comparison Γ(x) ≤ lˆO . is ordering
on base types implies the ordering on security levels Γ(x)(P) ≤ lO (in the latice L ) for every
permission set P . is is equivalent to saying that lO is an upper bound of the security levels of
x under all possible permission sets: ⊔{Γ(x)(P) | P ∈P} ≤ lO . If the base type of each variable
assigns the same security level to every permission set (i.e., the security level is independent of
the permissions), then our notion of indistinguishability coincides with the standard definition for
the non-dependent seing.
For the remaining of this paper, we assume that the security level of the observer is fixed to
some value lO ∈ L .
Lemma 2.11. =
lO
Γ
is an equivalence relation on EEnv .
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Lemma 2.12. If η =lO
Γ
η′ then for each P ∈P, η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′.
Before we proceed with proving the soundness of our type system, we need to make sure that
the system of apps are well-typed in the following sense:
Definition 2.13. Let S be a system, and let FD, FT and Θ be its function declaration table, func-
tion type table, and permission assignments. We say S is well-typed iff for every function A. f ,
⊢ FD(A. f ) : FT (A. f ) is derivable.
Recall thatwe assume no (mutual) recursions, so every function call chain in awell-typed system
is finite; this is formalized via the rank function below. We will use this as a measure in our
soundness proof (Lemma 2.19).
r(x := e) = 0
r(if e then c1 else c2) =max(r(c1), r(c2))
r(c1; c2) =max(r(c1), r(c2))
r(while e do c) = r(c)
r(letvar x = e in c) = r(c)
r(x := call A. f (e)) = r(FD(A. f )) + 1
r(test(p) c1 else c2) =max(r(c1), r(c2))
r(A. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
) = r(c)
e next two lemmas relate projection, promotion/demotion and the indistinguishability relation.
Lemma 2.14. If p ∈ P , then η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′ iff η =lO
πP (Γ↑p )
η′.
Lemma 2.15. If p < P , then η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′ iff η =lO
πP (Γ↓p )
η′.
e following two lemmas are the analogs to the simple security property and the confinement
property in [34].
Lemma 2.16. Suppose Γ ⊢ e : t . For P ∈ P, if t(P) ≤ lO and η =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′, η ⊢ e { v and
η′ ⊢ e { v ′, then v = v ′.
Lemma 2.17. Suppose Γ;A ⊢ c : t . en for any P ∈P, if t(P)  lO and η;A; P ⊢ c { η′, then
η =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′.
Definition 2.18. A commandc executed in appA is said to benoninterferent iff. for allη1,η
′
1, Γ, P, lO ,
if η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′1, η1;A; P ⊢ c { η2 and η
′
1;A; P ⊢ c { η
′
2 then η2 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′2.
e main technical lemma is that well-typed commands are noninterferent.
Lemma 2.19. Suppose Γ;A ⊢ c : t , for any P ∈ P, if η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′1, η1;A; P ⊢ c { η2, and
η′1;A; P ⊢ c { η
′
2, then η2 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′2.
Proof. eproof proceeds by induction on r(c), with subinduction on the derivations of Γ;Θ;A ⊢
c : t and η1;Θ; P ;A ⊢ c { η2. In the following, we omit the superscript lO from =
lO
πP (Γ)
to sim-
plify presentation. We show two interesting cases here; the complete proof can be found in the
appendices.
T-CALL: In this case, c has the form x := call B. f (e). Suppose the typing derivation is the
following (where we label the premises for ease of reference later):
FT (B. f ) = s → s ′ (T1) Γ ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(s) (T2) πΘ(A)(s
′) ≤ Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
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where t = Γ(x), and the executions under η1 and η
′
1 are derived, respectively, as follows:
(E1) η1 ⊢ e { v1 (E2) [y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0];B;Θ(A) ⊢ c1 { η3
η1;A; P ⊢ x := call B. f (e) { η1[x 7→ η3(r )]
(E′
1
) η′1 ⊢ e { v2 (E
′
2
) [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0];B;Θ(A) ⊢ c1 { η
′
3
η′1;A; P ⊢ x := call B. f (e) { η
′
1[x 7→ η
′
3(r )]
where FD(B. f ) = B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c1; return r }
}
, η2 = η1[x 7→ η3(r )] and η
′
2 = η
′
1[x 7→
η′3(r )].
Moreover, since we consider only well-typed systems, the function FD(B. f ) is also typable:
(T3) [y : s, r : s
′];B ⊢ c1 : s
Θ ⊢ B. f (y)
{
init r = 0 in {c1; return r }
}
: s → s ′
First we note that if t(P)  lO then the result follows from Lemma 2.17. So in the following, we
assume t(P) ≤ lO . Since t = Γ(x), it follows that Γ(x)(P) ≤ lO .
Let Γ′ = πΘ(A)([y : t , r : s]). We first prove several claims:
• Claim 1: [y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0] =Γ′ [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0].
Proof: Let ρ = [y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0] and ρ
′
= [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0]. We only need to check
that the two mappings agree on mappings of y that are of type ≤ lˆO . Suppose yu is such a
variable, i.e., Γ′(yu ) = u ≤ lˆO , and suppose ρ(yu ) = vu and ρ
′(yu ) = v
′
u for some yu ∈ y.
From (E1) we have η1 ⊢ eu { vu and from (E2) we have η
′
1 ⊢ eu { v
′
u , and from (T1) we
have Γ ⊢ eu : u. Since u ≤ lO , applying Lemma 2.16, we get vu = v
′
u .
• Claim 2: η3 =Γ′ η
′
3.
Proof: From Claim 1, we know that
[y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0] =Γ′ [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0].
Since r(c1) < r(c), we can apply the outer induction hypothesis to (E2), (E
′
2
) and (T3) to
obtain η3 =Γ′ η
′
3.
• Claim 3: η3(r ) = η
′
3(r ).
Proof: We first note that from (T2) and the assumption that Γ(x)(P) ≤ lO , we get
(πΘ(A)(s
′))(P) ≤ lO . e laer, by Definition 2.7, implies that s
′(Θ(A)) ≤ lO . Since r ∈
dom(Γ′), it is obvious that Γ′ ⊢ r : s ′, η3 ⊢ r { η3(r ) and η
′
3 ⊢ r { η
′
3(r ). From Claim 2, we
have η3 =Γ′ η
′
3. erefore by Lemma 2.16, we have η3(r ) = η
′
3(r ).
e statement we are trying to prove, i.e., η2 =πP (Γ) η
′
2, follows immediately from Claim 3.
T-CP: Suppose c is test(p) c1 else c2 and we have
Γ ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1 Γ ↓p ;A ⊢ c2 : t2 t = t1 ⊲p t2
Γ;A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : t
Suppose that p ∈ P . en the evaluation of c under η1 and η
′
1 are respectively:
p ∈ P η1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η2
η1;A; P ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 { η2
p ∈ P η′1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′
2
η′1;A; P ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 { η
′
2
Since η1 =πP (Γ) η
′
1 and since p ∈ P , by Lemma 2.14, we have η1 =πP (Γ↑p ) η
′
1. erefore by the
induction hypothesis applied to Γ ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1, η1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η2 and η
′
1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′
2, we
obtain η2 =πP (Γ↑p ) η
′
2, and by Lemma 2.14, we get η2 =πP (Γ) η
′
2.
For the case where p < P , we apply a similar reasoning as above, but using Lemma 2.15 in place
of Lemma 2.14. 
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Definition 2.20. Let S be a system. A function
A. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
in S with FT (A. f ) = t → t ′ is noninterferent if for all η1,η
′
1, P,v, lO , if the following hold:
• t ′(P) ≤ lO ,
• η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′1, where Γ = [x : t , r : t
′],
• η1;A; P ⊢ c { η2, and η
′
1;A; P ⊢ c { η
′
2,
then η2(r ) = η
′
2(r ). e system S is noninterferent iff all functions in S are noninterferent.
e noninterferent property of well-typed systems follows from Lemma 2.19.
Theorem 2.21. Well-typed systems are noninterferent.
3 TYPE INFERENCE
is section provides a decidable inference algorithm for the language in Sec. 2.2. Sec. 3.1 presents
the permission trace rules (Fig. 3) and discusses its equivalence to the typing rules (Fig. 2) in Sec. 2.4;
based on this, Sec. 3.2 reduces the type inference into a constraint solving problem; Sec. 3.3 pro-
vides the detailed procedures to solve the generated constraints. Detailed definitions and proofs
can be found at Appx. B.
3.1 Permission Tracing
To infer a security type for an expression, a command or a function, we need to track the adjust-
ments of variables depending on permission checks, i.e., the applications of promotions Γ ↑p and
demotions Γ ↓q in their typing derivations. To this end, we keep the applications symbolic and
collect the promotions and demotions into a sequence. In other words, we treat them as a sequence
of promotions ↑p and demotions ↓p applied on a typing environment Γ. For example, (Γ↑p ) ↓q can
be viewed as an application of the sequence ↑p↓q on Γ. e sequence of promotions and demotions
is called permission trace and denoted as Λ. e grammar of Λ is:
Λ ::= ⊕p :: Λ | ⊖ p :: Λ | ϵ p ∈ P
Let occur (p,Λ) be the number of occurrences of p in Λ. We say Λ is consistent iff. occur (p,Λ) ∈
{0, 1},∀p ∈ P. e length of Λ, denoted as len(Λ), is defined as:
len(Λ) =
{
0 if Λ = ϵ
1 + len(Λ′) if Λ = ⊚p :: Λ′,⊚ ∈ {⊕, ⊖}
Definition 3.1. Given a base type t and a permission trace Λ, the application of Λ on t , denoted
as t · Λ, is defined as:
t · Λ =

t if Λ = ϵ
(t ↑p ) · Λ
′ if ∃p,Λ′.(Λ = ⊕p :: Λ′)
(t ↓p ) · Λ
′ if ∃p,Λ′.(Λ = ⊖p :: Λ′)
We also extend the application of a permission trace Λ to a typing environment Γ (denoted as
Γ · Λ), such that ∀x . (Γ · Λ)(x) = Γ(x) · Λ. Based on permission traces, we give the definition of
partial subtyping relation.
Definition 3.2. e partial subtyping relation ≤Λ, which is the subtyping relation applied on the
permission trace, is defined as s ≤Λ t iff. s · Λ ≤ t · Λ.
Lemma 3.3. ∀t ∈ T , p,q ∈ P s.t. p , q , t · (⊚p ⊛ q) = t · (⊛q ⊚ p), where ⊚,⊛, ∈ {⊕, ⊖}.
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TT-VAR
Γ;Λ ⊢t x : Γ(x)
TT-OP
Γ;Λ ⊢t e1 : t1 Γ;Λ ⊢t e2 : t2
Γ;Λ ⊢t e1 op e2 : t1 ⊔ t2
TT-ASS
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t t ≤Λ Γ(x)
Γ;Λ ⊢t x := e : Γ(x)
TT-LETVAR
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s Γ[x : s
′];Λ;A ⊢t c : t s ≤Λ s
′
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t letvar x = e in c : t
TT-IF
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c1 : t1 Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c2 : t2 t ≤Λ t1 ⊓ t2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t if e then c1 else c2 : t1 ⊓ t2
TT-WHILE
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : t s ≤Λ t
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t while c do e : t
TT-SEQ
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c1 : t1 Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c2 : t2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c1; c2 : t1 ⊓ t2
TT-CALL
FT (B. f ) = t −→ t ′ Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s s ≤Λ πΘ(A)(t) πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤Λ Γ(x)
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
TT-CP
Γ;Λ :: ⊕p;A ⊢t c1 : t1 Γ;Λ :: ⊖p;A ⊢t c2 : t2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t test(p) c1 else c2 : t1 ⊲p t2
TT-FUN
[x : t , r : t ′]; ϵ ;B ⊢t c : s
⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ t ′
Fig. 3. Trace rules for expressions, commands and functions, given a function-type table FT and a permission
assignment Θ.
Lemma 3.4. ∀t ∈ T ,(t ·⊚p) · Λ = (t · Λ) ·⊚p, where ⊚ ∈ {⊕, ⊖} and p < Λ.
Lemma 3.5. ∀t ∈ T , p ∈ P,(t ·⊚p) ·⊛p = t · (⊚p), where ⊚,⊛ ∈ {⊕, ⊖}.
Lemma 3.6. ∀t ∈ T , (t · Λ) · Λ = t · Λ.
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 state that the order of applications of promotions and demotions on different
permissions does not affect the result. Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 indicate that only the first application
takes effect if there exist several (consecutive) applications of promotions and demotions on the
same permission p. erefore, we can safely keep the first application, by removing the other
applications on the same permission. In the remaining, we assume that all permission traces are
consistent. Moreover, to ensure that the traces collected from the derivations of commands are
consistent, we assume that in nested permission checks, each permission is checked at most once.
Besides, we split the applications of the promotions and demotions into two parts (i.e., typing
environments and permission traces), and move the subsumption rules for expressions and com-
mands to where they are needed. is yields the syntax-directed typing rules, which are called the
permission trace rules and given in Fig. 3. e judgments of the trace rules are similar to those of
typing rules, except that each trace rule is guarded by the permission trace Λ collected from the
context, which keeps track of the adjustments of variables depending on the permission checks,
and that the subtyping relation in the trace rules is the partial subtyping one ≤Λ.
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e next two lemmas show the trace rules are sound and complete with respect to the typing
rules, i.e., an expression (command, function, resp.) is typable under the trace rules, if and only if
it is typable under the typing rules.
Lemma 3.7. (a) If Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t , then Γ · Λ ⊢ e : (t · Λ).
(b) If Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : t , then (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : (t · Λ).
(c) If ⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ t ′, then ⊢ B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
:
t −→ t ′.
Lemma 3.8. (a) If Γ · Λ ⊢ e : t · Λ, then there exists s such that Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s and s ≤Λ t .
(b) If (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : t · Λ, then there exists s such that Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : s and t ≤Λ s .
(c) If ⊢ B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ s , then ⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
:
t −→ s .
3.2 Constraint Generation
is section provides the constraint generation rules to reduce the type inference into a constraint
solving problem.
To infer function types in SystemS, we firstly assign a function typeα→β for each functionA. f
whose type is unknown and a type variable γ for each variable x with unknown type respectively,
whereα , β,γ are fresh type variables. en according to the trace rules, we try to build a derivation
forS, in whichwe collect the side conditions needed by the rules, i.e., the partial subtyping relation
≤Λ appearing in the rules. If the side conditions hold under a context, then FD(A. f ) is typed by
FT (A. f ) under the same context for each function A. f in S.
To describe the side conditions (i.e., ≤Λ), we define the permission guarded constraints as fol-
lows:
c ::= (Λ, tl ≤ tr )
tl ::= α | tд | tl ⊔ tl | πP (tl )
tr ::= α | tд | tr ⊓ tr | tr ⊲p tr | πP (tr )
where Λ is a permission trace, α is a fresh type variable and tд is a ground type.
A type substitution is a finite mapping from type variables to security types: θ ::= ϵ | α 7→ t , θ
Definition 3.9. Given a constraint setC and a substitution θ , we say θ is a solution ofC , denoted
as θ  C , iff. for each (Λ, tl ≤ tr ) ∈ C , tlθ ≤Λ trθ holds.
e constraint generation rules are presented in Fig. 4, where FTC is the extended function type
table such that FTC maps all function names to function types and their corresponding constraint
sets. e judgments of the constraint rules are similar to those of trace rules, except that each
constraint rule generates a constraint set C , which consists of the side conditions needed by the
typing derivation of S. In addition, as the function call chains starting from a command are finite,
the constraint generation will terminate.
Next, we prove the constraint rules are sound and complete with respect to the trace rules, i.e.,
the constraint set generated by the derivation of an expression (command, function, resp.) under
the constraint rules is solvable, if and only if an expression (command, function, resp.) is typable
under the trace rules.
Lemma 3.10. e following statements hold:
(a) If Γ;Λ ⊢д e : t { C and θ  C , then Γθ ;Λ ⊢t e : tθ .
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TG-VAR
Γ;Λ ⊢д x : Γ(x){ ∅
TG-OP
Γ;Λ ⊢д e1 : t1 { C1 Γ;Λ ⊢д e2 : t2 { C2
Γ;Λ ⊢д e1 op e2 : t1 ⊔ t2 { C1 ∪C2
TG-ASS
Γ;Λ ⊢д e : t { C
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д x := e : Γ(x){ C ∪ {(Λ, t ≤ Γ(x))}
TG-LETVAR
Γ;Λ ⊢д e : s { C1 Γ[x : α];Λ;A ⊢д c : t { C2 C = C1 ∪C2 ∪ {(Λ, s ≤ α)}
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д letvar x = e in c : t { C
TG-IF
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c1 : t1 { C1 Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c2 : t2 { C2
Γ;Λ ⊢д e : t { Ce C = Ce ∪C1 ∪C2 ∪ {(Λ, t ≤ t1 ⊓ t2)}
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д if e then c1 else c2 : t1 ⊓ t2 { C
TG-WHILE
Γ;Λ ⊢д e : s { C Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c : t { C
′
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д while e do c : t { C ∪C
′ ∪ {(Λ, s ≤ t)}
TG-SEQ
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c1 : t1 { C1 Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c2 : t2 { C2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c1; c2 : t1 ⊓ t2 { C1 ∪C2
TG-CALL
FTC (B. f ) = (t −→ t
′,Cf ) Γ;Λ ⊢д e : s {
⋃
Ce
Ca = {(Λ, s ≤ πΘ(A)(t)), (Λ, πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤ Γ(x))}
C = Cf ∪
⋃
Ce ∪Ca
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x){ C
TG-CP
Γ;Λ :: ⊕p;A ⊢д c1 : t1 { C1 Γ;Λ :: ⊖p;A ⊢д c2 : t2 { C2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д test(p) c1 else c2 : t1 ⊲p t2 { C1 ∪C2
TG-FUN
[x : α , r : β]; ϵ ;B ⊢д c : s { C
⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: α −→ β { C
Fig. 4. Constraint generation rules for expressions, commands and functions, given function type table FTC .
(b) If Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c : t { C and θ  C , then Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t c : tθ .
(c) If ⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: α → β { C and θ  C , then
⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: θ (α) −→ θ (β).
Lemma 3.11. e following statements hold:
(a) If Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t , then there exist Γ
′, t ′,C, θ s.t. Γ′;Λ ⊢д e : t
′
{ C , θ  C , Γ′θ = Γ and t ′θ = t .
(b) If Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : t , then there exist Γ
′, t ′,C, θ s.t. Γ′;Λ;A ⊢д c : t
′
{ C , θ  C , Γ′θ = Γ and
t ′θ = t .
(c) If ⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: tp −→ tr , then there exist α , β,C, θ s.t.
⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: α −→ β { C,
θ  C , and (α −→ β)θ = tp −→ tr , where α , β are fresh type variables.
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3.3 Constraint Solving
is section presents a constraint solving algorithm for the constraints generated by the rules in
Fig. 4. For these constraints, both types appearing on the two sides of subtyping are guarded by
the same permission trace, which is the one collected from the current context. While during
the solving of these constraints, there may be some constraints on whose two sides the types are
guarded by different traces. Take the constraint
(
Λ, πP (tl ) ≤ πQ (α)
)
as an example, tl is indeed
guarded by P while α is guarded byQ , where P andQ are different permission sets. erefore, we
use a generalized version of the permission guarded constraint, allowing types on the two sides
to be guarded by different permission traces:(
(Λl , tl ) ≤ (Λr , tr )
)
Similarly, a solution to a generalized constraint set C is a substitution θ , denoted as θ  C , such
that for each
(
(Λl , tl ) ≤ (Λr , tr )
)
∈ C , (tlθ · Λl ) ≤ (trθ · Λr ) holds.
It is easy to transfer a permission guarded constraint set C into a generalized constraint set C ′:
by rewriting each
(
Λ, tl ≤ tr
)
as
(
(Λ, tl ) ≤ (Λ, tr )
)
. Moreover, it is trivial that θ  C ⇐⇒ θ  C ′.
erefore, we will focus on the solving of generalized constraints in the following.
Given a permission set P and a permission trace Λ, we say P entails Λ, denoted as P  Λ, iff.
∀ ⊕ p ∈ Λ. p ∈ P and ∀ ⊖ p ∈ Λ. p < P . A permission trace Λ is satisfiable, denoted as ∆(Λ), iff.
there exists a permission set P such that p  Λ.
e constraint solving consists of the following steps:
• decompose the types in constraints into type variables and ground types;
• saturate the constraint set by the transitivity of the subtyping relation;
• merge the lower and upper bounds of same variables;
• unify the constraints to emit a solution.
3.3.1 Decomposition. e first step to solve the guarded constraints is to decompose the types
into the simpler ones, i.e., type variables and ground types, according to their structures. e
decomposing rules are given in Fig. 5. Rules (CD-CUP), (CD-CAP) and (CD-SVAR) are trivial.
Rule (CD-MEGER) states that two p-merged types satisfy the relation if and only if both their p-
promotions and p-demotions satisfy the relation, where t can be viewed as a p-merged type t ⊲p t .
e projection of types yields a “monomorphic type” such that any successive trace application
makes no changes, thereforewe have (CD-LAPP) and (CD-RAPP). Rules (CD-SUB0) and (CD-SUB1)
handle the constraints on ground types.
Aer decomposition, constraints have one of the forms:(
(Λ,α) ≤ (Λ′, tд)
)
,
(
(Λ, tд) ≤ (Λ
′, β)
)
,
(
(Λ,α) ≤ (Λ′, β)
)
3.3.2 Saturation. We treat each permission trace Λ as a boolean logic formula on permissions,
where ⊕ and ⊖ denote positive and negative respectively. In the remaining we shall use the logic
connectives on permission traces freely. We also adopt the disjunctive normal form, i.e., a disjunc-
tion of conjunctive permissions, and denote it as dnf (·). For example, dnf ((⊕p) ∧ ¬(⊕q ∧ ⊖r )) =
(⊕p ∧ ⊖q) ∨ (⊕p ∧ ⊕r ).
To ensure any lower bound (e.g.,
(
(Λ1, t1) ≤ (Λr ,α)
)
) of a variable α is “smaller” than any of
its upper bound (e.g.,
(
(Λl ,α) ≤ (Λ2, t2)
)
, we need to saturate the constraint set by adding these
conditions. However, since our constraints are guarded by permission traces, we need to consider
lower-upper bound relations only when the traces of the variable α can be entailed by the same
permission set, i.e., their intersection is satisfiable (i.e., ∆(Λl ∧ Λr )). en we extend the traces of
both the lower and upper bound constraints such that the traces of α are the same (i.e., Λl ∧ Λr ),
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CD-CUP
C ∪ {
(
(Λ, t1 ⊔ t2) ≤ (Λ
′, t)
)
} {d C ∪ {
(
(Λ, t1) ≤ (Λ
′, t)
)
,
(
(Λ, t2) ≤ (Λ
′, t)
)
}
CD-CAP
C ∪ {
(
(Λ, t) ≤ (Λ, t1 ⊓ t2)
)
} {d C ∪ {
(
(Λ, t) ≤ (Λ′, t1)
)
,
(
(Λ, t) ≤ (Λ′, t2)
)
}
CD-LAPP
C ∪ {
(
(Λ, πP (t)) ≤ (Λ
′, t ′)
)
} {d C ∪ {
(
(ΛP , t) ≤ (Λ
′, t ′)
)
}
CD-RAPP
C ∪ {
(
(Λ, t) ≤ (Λ′, πP (α))
)
} {d C ∪ {
(
(Λ, t) ≤ (Λ′P ,α)
)
}
CD-SVAR
C ∪ {
(
(Λ,α) ≤ (Λ,α)
)
} {d C
CD-SUB0
tд · Λ ≤ sд · Λ
′
C ∪ {
(
(Λ, tд) ≤ (Λ
′, sд)
)
} {d C
CD-SUB1
tд · Λ  sд · Λ′
C ∪ {
(
(Λ, tд) ≤ (Λ
′, sд)
)
} {d ⊥
CD-MERGE
C ′ = {
(
(Λ :: ⊕p, t) ≤ (Λ′ :: ⊕p, t1)
)
,
(
(Λ :: ⊖p, t) ≤ (Λ′ :: ⊖p, t2)
)
}
C ∪ {
(
(Λ, t) ≤ (Λ′, t1 ⊲p t2)
)
} {d C ∪C
′
CS-LU
Λ
′
l
= (Λl ∧ Λr ) − Λr Λ
′
r = (Λl ∧ Λr ) − Λl
∆(Λl ∧ Λr ) {(Λ1 ∧ Λ
′
r , t1 ≤ Λ2 ∧ Λ
′
l
, t2)} {d C
′
{
(
(Λ1, t1) ≤ (Λr ,α)
)
,
(
(Λl ,α) ≤ (Λ2, t2)
)
} ⊆ C {s C ∪C
′
CM-GLB
ϕ(I ′) = {Λ ∈ dnf (
∧
i ∈I ′ Λir ∧
∧
i ∈I\I ′ ¬Λir ) | ∆(Λ)} t
⊔
I ′,Λ = ⊔i ∈I ′(ti · (Λil ∧ (Λ − Λir )))
C ∪ {
(
(Λil , ti ) ≤ (Λir ,α)
)
}i ∈I {m1 C ∪ {
(
(ϵ, t⊔I ′,Λ) ≤ (Λ,α)
)
}I ′⊆I,Λ∈ϕ (I ′)
CM-LUB
ϕ(I ′) = {Λ ∈ dnf (
∧
i ∈I ′ Λil ∧
∧
i ∈I\I ′ ¬Λil ) | ∆(Λ)} t
⊓
I ′,Λ = ⊓i ∈I ′(ti · (Λir ∧ (Λ − Λil )))
C ∪ {
(
(Λil ,α) ≤ (Λir , ti )
)
}i ∈I {m1 C ∪ {
(
(Λ,α) ≤ (ϵ, t⊓I ′,Λ)
)
}I ′⊆I,Λ∈ϕ (I ′)
CM-BDS
C1i, j = {(ti · (Λ − Λi ) ≤ (Λ,α) ≤ tj · (Λ − Λj ) | Λ ∈ dnf (Λi ∧ Λj ) and ∆(Λ)}
C2i, j = {(ti · (Λ − Λi ) ≤ (Λ,α) ≤ H | Λ ∈ dnf (Λi ∧ ¬Λj ) and ∆(Λ)}
C3i, j = {(L ≤ (Λ,α) ≤ tj · (Λ − Λj ) | Λ ∈ dnf (Λj ∧ ¬Λj ) and ∆(Λ)}
C ∪ {
(
(ϵ, ti ) ≤ (Λi ,α)
)
i ∈I ,
(
(Λj ,α) ≤ (ϵ, tj )
)
j∈J } {m2 C ∪
⋃
i ∈I, j∈J (C
1
i, j ∪C
2
i, j ∪C
3
i, j )
CM-SBD
C ∪ {(t1 ≤ (Λ,α) ≤ s1), (t2 ≤ (Λ,α) ≤ s2)} {m3 C ∪ {(t1 ⊔ t2 ≤ (Λ,α) ≤ s1 ⊓ s2)}
Fig. 5. Constraint solving rules, including decomposition (CD-), saturation (CS-) and merging (CM-), where
ΛP denotes the trace that only P can entail, − denotes set difference, t
⊔
∅,Λ
= L, and t⊓
∅,Λ
= H .
by adding the missing traces (i.e., Λl ∧ Λr −Λr for lower bound constraint while Λl ∧ Λr −Λl for
the upper one, where − denotes set difference). e rule is given as (CS-LU) in Fig. 5.
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Assume that there is an order < on type variables and the smaller variable has a higher priority.
If two variables α , β with O(α) < O(β) (the orderings) are in the same constraint β ≤ α , we
consider the larger variable β is a bound for the lower one α , but not vice-versa. ere is a special
case of
(
(Λ,α) ≤ (Λ′,α)
)
. In that case, we regroup all the trace of α as {Λi | i ∈ I } such that∨
i ∈I Λi = ϵ and ∀i, j ∈ I .i , j ⇒ ¬∆(Λi ∧ Λj ), and rewrite the constraints of α w.r.t. {Λi | i ∈ I }.
en we treat each (Λi ,α) as different fresh variables αi . erefore, with the ordering, there are
no loops like: (Λ,α) ≤ . . . ≤ (Λ′,α).
3.3.3 Merging. Next, we would like to merge the constraints on an identical variable. As con-
straints are guarded by permission traces, we need to consider the satisfiability of (any subset of)
the permission traces of the same variable under any permission set. e merging rules are pre-
sented in Fig. 5 as well. Rule (CM-GLB) handles the lower bounds of an identical type variable.
Let us consider the lower bounds {
(
(Λi , ti ) ≤ (Λir ,α)
)
| i ∈ I } of a type variable α , guarded by
the possibly different permission traces Λir . Assume that only the traces in I
′ ⊆ I can be entailed
by a permission set P simultaneously, that is, the common trace dnf (
∧
i ∈I ′ Λir ∧
∧
i ∈I\I ′ ¬Λir ) is
satisfied. We adjust each constraint in I ′ by extending the traces with the missing one, which is
the common trace minus the trace of α . Aer that, the variable α in all the constraints of I ′ are
guarded by an identical trace. en it is easy for us to deduce a greatest lower bound for α , that is,
⊔i ∈I ′ti ·Λ
′
i , where Λ
′
i is the extended trace of ti . Similar to Rule (CM-GLB), Rule (CM-LUB) handles
the upper bounds of an identical type variable, yielding a least upper bound. Rule (CM-BDS) com-
bines the greatest lower bound and the least upper bound of an identical type variable, which also
needs to consider the satisfiability of the possibly different traces. Finally, Rule (CM-SBD) merges
the possible redundant bounds under the same trace. Note that, the traces of the bounds are ϵ and
thus can be omied.
Aer merging, for each type variable α , its constraints {(ti ≤ (Λi ,α) ≤ si )}i ∈I (if exists) satisfy
that (1) the union of all Λi is the full set (i.e.,
∨
i ∈I Λi = ϵ) and (2) the intersection of different
traces is unsatisfiable (i.e., ∀i, j ∈ I .i , j ⇒ ¬∆(Λi ∧ Λj )).
Given two constraint sets C1,C2, we say C1 entails C2, denoted as C1  C2, iff. for any substitu-
tion θ , if θ  C1, then θ  C2. We proved that the constraint solving rules are sound and complete,
i.e., the original constraint set entails the converted set (obtained by decomposition, saturation
and merging), and vice-versa.
Lemma 3.12. If C {r C
′, then C  C ′ and C ′  C , where r ∈ {d, s,m}.
3.3.4 Unification. Now the constraints to be solved are of the form {(ti ≤ (Λi ,α) ≤ si )}i ∈I ,
stating that α can take a type that ranges from ti to si under the permission trace Λi . Let αi denote
such a type, where αi is a fresh type variable. So the constraint (ti ≤ (Λi ,α) ≤ si ) can be rewrien
as an equivalent equation (Λi ,α) = (ti ⊔ αi ) ⊓ si .
We define an equation system E as a set of equations (Λ,α) = t , and a solution to E is a substi-
tution θ , denoted as θ  E, s.t. for each (Λ,α) = t ∈ E, (θ (α) · Λ) = tθ . It is trivial that a constraint
set C can be equivalently transformed into an equation system E s.t. θ  C ⇐⇒ θ  E.
As mentioned above, the trace set {Λi | i ∈ I } of an identical variable is full (i.e.,
∨
i ∈I Λi = ϵ)
and disjoint (i.e., ∀i, j ∈ I .i , j ⇒ ¬∆(Λi ∧ Λj )). For each permission set P , there exists a unique
trace Λi such that P  Λi . Hence, a type t for α can be constructed:
t(P) = ((ti ⊔ αi ) ⊓ si )(P) P  Λi
e algorithm below presents the unification algorithm that solves the equation system E. It is
provable that the unification algorithm is sound and complete.
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let toType {(Λi , ti )}i ∈I = t s.t. t(P) = ti if P  Λi in
let subst θ ((Λj , β) = sj ) = ((Λj , β) = sjθ ) in
let rec equ2sub E =
match E with
| [] → []
| {(Λi ,α) = ti }i ∈I :: E
′ where isMax(O(α)) →
let tα = toType {(Λi , ti )}i ∈I in
let E ′′ = List .map (subst [α 7→ tα ]) E
′ in
let θ ′ = equ2sub E ′′ in
θ ′[α 7→ tα ]
in equ2sub E
Lemma 3.13. If uni f y(E) = θ , then θ  E.
Lemma 3.14. If θ  E, then there exist θ ′ and θ ′′ such that uni f y(E) = θ ′ and θ = θ ′θ ′′.
To conclude, an expression (command, function, resp.) is typable, if and only if it is derivable
under the constraint rules with a solvable constraint set by our algorithm. erefore, our type
inference system is sound and complete. Moreover, as the function call chains are finite, the con-
straint generation terminates with a finite constraint set, which can be solved by our algorithm in
finite steps. us, our type inference system terminates.
Theorem 3.15. e type inference system is sound, complete and decidable.
4 EXAMPLES
is section presents two examples. e first one is to demonstrate how our inference system is
performed and the second one is the motivating example in Sec. 1. e prototype implementation
of our inference tool and additional results can be found at hp://bit.ly/2f3yVL0.
4.1 Illustrative Example
Consider the following function:
f ( ) {
i n i t r =0 in
t e s t ( p ) r = info ( p ) ;
e l se r = 0 ;
t e s t ( q ) r = r + info ( q ) ;
e l se r = r+ 0 ;
return r
}
Suppose that the type variable assigned to r is α and thus the type for f is () → α . Let us apply
the constraint rules in Fig. 4 on each command, yielding the constraint set: {(⊕p, lp ≤ α), (⊖p, L ≤
α), (⊕q,α ⊔ lq ≤ α), (⊖q,α ⊔ L ≤ α)}. By transforming each constraint into the generalized form,
we obtain the following set
{(⊕p, lp ≤ ⊕p,α), (⊖p, L ≤ ⊖p,α),
(⊕q,α ⊔ lq ≤ ⊕q,α), (⊖q,α ⊔ L ≤ ⊖q,α)}
Next, we perform the constraint solving algorithm on the set above as follows.
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Decomposition e last two constraints are not in their simple forms therefore Rule (CD-CUP)
is applied, yielding:
{(⊕p, lp ≤ ⊕p,α), (⊖p, L ≤ ⊖p,α),
(⊕q, lq ≤ ⊕q,α), (⊖q, L ≤ ⊖q,α)}
Saturation Since there is only one type variable α and there are only the lower bounds for α , the
constraint set remains unchanged aer saturation.
Merging ere are several lower bounds for α under different traces. Hence, we need to consider
the satisfiability of the combinations of permission traces. ere are four possible cases:
(1) ⊕p ⊕ q; (2) ⊕p ⊖ q; (3) ⊖p ⊕ q; (4) ⊖p ⊖ q. For each case, only the constraints that are
satisfied with it are considered. For example, since ⊖p and ⊖q are not compatible to ⊕p⊕q,
only (⊕p, lp ≤ ⊕p,α) and (⊕q, lq ≤ ⊕q,α) are considered. e merging result is:
{(lp ⊔ lq ≤ (⊕p ⊕ q,α)), (lp ≤ (⊕p ⊖ q,α)),
(lq ≤ (⊖p ⊕ q,α)), (L ≤ (⊖p ⊖ q,α))}
Unification By picking the least upper bound, we obtain a feasible type t for α :
t = {(⊕p ⊕ q, lp ⊔ lq), (⊕p ⊖ q, lp ), (⊖p ⊕ q, lq), (⊖p ⊖ q, L)}
Focusing on permissions p and q, t can be rewrien as
t =
{
∅ → ∅, {p} → {p}, {q} → {q}, {p,q} → {p,q}
}
erefore, the type of f is () → t .
4.2 Retrospection on the Motivating Example
Recall the function getInfo in Sec. 1 2. Assume the type of r is α , and thus the type for getInfo
is () → α . According to the constraint rules, we obtain the following constraint set {(⊕p ⊕ q, l1 ≤
α), (⊕p ⊖ q, L ≤ α), (⊖p ⊕ q, l1 ⊔ l2 ≤ α), (⊖p ⊖ q, L ≤ α)}, where l1 and l2 are the security levels
for loc and id respectively, and l1 and l2 are incomparable. Following constraint solving steps, we
get the inferred type t =
{
(⊕p ⊕ q, l1), (⊕p ⊖ q, L), (⊖p ⊕ q,H ), (⊖p ⊖ q, L)
}
.
5 RELATED WORK
ere is a large body of work on language-based information flow security. We shall discuss here
only closely related work.
We have discussed the work by Banerjee and Naumann [2] (in Sec. 1) from which we base the
design of our type system on. Our work differs significantly from their in three major aspects.
e fundamental change is the merging type constructor that extends the type system, which are
crucial to make our type system more precise than BN. Another difference with BN type system
is in the permission model. In Android apps, permissions are not associated with Java classes, so
there is no need to take into account stack inspection in the type system. Permissions are enforced
only when doing remote procedure calls and are only aware of the permissions of its immediate
caller (app B). Our typing rule (T-CALL) captures this feature. We also provide a decidable type
inference algorithm, which was not given in prior relevant work. is is necessary since otherwise
it is impractical to annotate each type explicitly.
Value-dependent type information flow system provides a general treatment of security types
that may depend on other program variables [18, 19, 21–25, 27, 31–33, 35, 37, 38]. For example,
2Note that the program syntax is sightly different from the one in Sec. 2.2 but can be adapted into the laer easily. e empty
string, like the integer literal 0 in the language, is considered L. Our prototype implementation does support primitive data
types like integer, float, and string.
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Murray et al [23–25, 35] provided a value-dependent timing-sensitive noninterference for concur-
rent shared memory programs under compositional refinement. We think, however, the closest to
our work is perhaps the dependent type system of Lourenc¸o and Caires [21]. In their type system,
security labels may be indexed by data structures, which can be used to encode the dependency
of the security labels on other values in the system. It may be possible to encode our notion of
security types as a dependent type in their seing, by treating permission sets explicitly as an
additional parameter to a function or a service, and to specify security levels of the output of the
function as a type dependent on that parameter. Currently it is not yet clear to us how one could
give a general construction of the index types in their type system that would correspond to our
security types, and how the merge operator would translate to their dependent type constructors,
among other things. Such a correspondence would be of interests since it may help to clarify some
problems we encountered, such as the parameter laundering aack, to see whether they can be
reduced to some well-understood problems in the literature of noninterference type systems. We
leave the exact correspondence to the future work.
Recent research on information flow has also been conducted to deal with mobile security is-
sues [6, 7, 12, 13, 15, 20, 26], especially on Android platform. SCandroid [6, 13] is a tool targeting
for automated security certification of Android apps, which focuses on typing communication
between applications. Unlike our work, they do not consider implicit flows, and do not take into
account access control in their type system. Ernst et al [12] proposed a verification model, SPARTA,
for use in app stores to guarantee that apps are free of malicious information flows. eir approach,
however, requires the collaboration between soware vendor and app store auditor and the addi-
tional modification of Android permission model to fit for their Information Flow Type-checker
(IFT); soundness proof is also absent. Our work is done in the context of providing information
flow security “certificate” for Android applications, following the Proof-Carrying-Code (PCC) ar-
chitecture by Necula and Lee [28] and does not require extra changes. noninterference
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We provided a lightweight type system featuring Android permission model for enforcing secure
information flow in an imperative language and proved its soundness with respect to noninter-
ference. e established system has a novel property that its security type can express arbitrary
relation between permissions and security level, and therefore may be applied in a wider range of
security policies such as those involving aggregation problems. We also developed a type infer-
ence algorithm by reducing it to a constraint solving problem and applying an efficient algorithm
to solve the laer.
We next discuss briefly several directions for future work.
Global variables. e language presented in this article does not allow global variables. In our
ongoingwork, we have shown that global variables can be integrated seamlessly in our framework.
e introduction of global variables presents a potential side channel through which information
could leak, via what we call “global variable laundering”. at is, information may flow through
global variables when they are wrien and read by apps with different permission contexts. Our
countermeasure is to forbid global variables to have polymorphic types (i.e., each of the types is
of the form lˆ given a security level l ), and we introduce another “global variable security type” in
typing rules for commands to track the function body effect. We are presently working on the
type inference on the extended type system. We also plan to extend our type system to include
more language features such as heaps, object-oriented extension, and exceptions.
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Runtime permission granting. If the permissions granting for an app are non-deterministic, such
as the case when the permission granting is subject to the user’s approval, then enforcing a non-
monotonic policies becomes problematic. In Android, certain permissions are classified as danger-
ous permissions, and are further partitioned into permission groups. ese permissions are not
automatically given to apps, but are instead subject to user’s approval at runtime when the per-
missions are exercised. However, an app can only request for permission it has explicitly declared
in the manifest file, so to this extent, we can statically determine whether a permission request
is definitely not going to be granted (because it is absent from the manifest), and whether it can
potentially be granted. So it is still possible to enforce monotonic policies, under the assumption
that all permissions in the manifest file are always granted. One possible way to accommodate
limited non-monotonic policies would be to separate dynamic permissions (i.e., those that require
runtime approval) and static permissions (any permissions declared in the manifest file that are not
dynamic permissions), and to allow policies to be non-monotonic on static permissions only. We
leave the detailed treatment of this refinement to future work.
Bytecode typing. Our eventual goal is to translate source code typing into Dalvik bytecode typ-
ing, following a similar approach done by Gilles Barthe et al [3–5] from Java source to JVM byte-
code. e key idea that we describe in the paper, i.e., precise characterizations of security of IPC
channels that depends on permission checks, can be applied to richer type systems such as such
as that used in the Cassandra project [20] or Gunadi et. al. type system [15]. We envision our
implementation can piggyback on, say, Cassandra system to improve the coverage of typable ap-
plications.
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A SOUNDNESS OF TYPE SYSTEM
Definition A.1. A base security type (or base type) t is a mapping fromP to L . We denote with
T the set of base types. Given two base types s, t , we say s = t iff s(P) = t(P) ∀ P ∈P and s ≤T t
iff ∀ P ∈P, s(P) ≤L t(P).
Lemma A.2. ≤T is a partial order relation on T .
Proof. Reflectivity ∀P, t(P) ≤L t(P) therefore t ≤T t .
Antisymmetry t ≤T s∧s ≤T t ⇐⇒ ∀P, t(P) ≤L s(P)∧s(P) ≤L t(P) therefore ∀P, t(P) = s(P),
which means that s = t .
Transitivity if r ≤T s and s ≤T t , ∀P, r (P) ≤L s(P) and s(P) ≤L t(P) therefore r (P) ≤L t(P),
which means that r ≤T t .

Definition A.3. For s, t ∈ T , s ⊔ t and s ⊓ t are defined as
(s ⊔ t)(P) = s(P) ⊔ t(P),∀P ∈P
(s ⊓ t)(P) = s(P) ⊓ t(P),∀P ∈P
Lemma A.4. Given two base types s and t , it follows that
(a) s ≤T s ⊔ t and t ≤T s ⊔ t .
(b) s ⊓ t ≤T s and s ⊓ t ≤T t .
Proof. Immediately from Definition A.1. 
Lemma A.5. (T , ≤T) forms a laice.
Proof. ∀s, t ∈ P, according to Lemma A.4, s ⊔ t is their upper bound. Suppose r is another
upper bound of them, i.e., s ≤T r and t ≤T r , whichmeans ∀P ∈P, (s⊔t)(P) = s(P)⊔t(P) ≤L r (P),
so s ⊔ t ≤ r . erefore s ⊔ t is the least upper bound of {s, t}. Similarly, s ⊓ t is s and t ’s greatest
lower bound. is makes (T , ≤T) a laice. 
Definition A.6. A function type has the form t → t , where t = (t1, . . . , tm),m ≥ 0 and t are base
types. e types t are the types for the arguments of the function and the base type t is the return
type of the function.
Definition A.7. Given a permission p, the promotion and demotion of a base type t with respect
to p are defined as follows:
(t ↑p )(P) = t(P ∪ {p}),∀P ∈P (promotion)
(t ↓p )(P) = t(P \ {p}),∀P ∈P (demotion)
e promotion and demotion of a function type t → t , where t = (t1, . . . , tm), are respectively
(t → t) ↑p= t ↑p → t ↑p , where t ↑p = (t1 ↑p , . . . , tm ↑p ),
(t → t) ↓p= t ↓p → t ↓p , where t ↓p = (t1 ↓p , . . . , tm ↓p ).
Lemma A.8. Given P ∈P and p ∈ P,
(a) If p ∈ P , then (t ↑p )(P) = t(P).
(b) If p < P , then (t ↓p )(P) = t(P).
Proof. If p ∈ P , P ∪ {p} = P , therefore (t ↑p )(P) = t(P ∪ {p}) = t(P); if p < P , P \ {p} = P ,
therefore (t ↓p )(P) = t(P \ {p}) = t(P). 
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Lemma A.9. If s ≤ t , then s ↑p≤ t ↑p and s ↓p≤ t ↓p .
Proof. For P ∈ P, since s ≤ t , s(P ∪ {p}) ≤ t(P ∪ {p}) and s(P \ {p}) ≤ t(P \ {p}), according to
Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.6, the conclusion follows. 
Definition A.10. Given t ∈ T and P ∈P, the projection of t on P is a security type πP (t) defined
as follows:
πP (t)(Q) = t(P), ∀Q ∈P.
is definiton of projection is extended to the projection of a list of types on P as follows:
πP ((t1, . . . , tn)) = (πP (t1), . . . , πP (tn)).
Definition A.11. Given a permission p and types t1 and t2, we define the merging of t1 and t2
along p as t1 ⊲p t2, which is:
(t1 ⊲p t2)(P) =
{
t1(P) p ∈ P
t2(P) p < P
∀P ∈P
Definition A.12. For all x ∈ dom(Γ), the environment promotion and demotion are respectively
(Γ ↑p )(x) = Γ(x) ↑p and (Γ ↓p )(x) = Γ(x) ↓p . e projection of Γ on P ∈ P is defined as
(πP (Γ))(x) = πP (Γ(x)) for each x ∈ dom(Γ).
Definition A.13. Given two evaluation environments η,η′, a typing environment Γ, a security
level lO ∈ L of the observer, we define an indistinguishability relation as follows:
η =
lO
Γ
η′ iff. ∀x ∈ dom(Γ). (Γ(x) ≤ lˆO ⇒ η(x) = η
′(x))
where η(x) = η′(x) holds iff both sides of the equation are defined and their values are identical,
or both sides are undefined.
Lemma A.14. =
lO
Γ
is an equivalence relation on EEnv .
Proof. Reflexivity Obviously η =lO
Γ
η.
Symmetry Since ∀x ∈ dom(Γ).(Γ(x) ≤ lˆO ⇒ η
′
=
lO
Γ
η).
Transitivity If η1 =
lO
Γ
η2 and η2 =
lO
Γ
η3, for a given x ∈ dom(Γ), when Γ(x) ≤ ˆlO , we have
η1(x) = η2(x) and η2(x) = η3(x).
(1) If η1(x) , ⊥, then η2(x) , ⊥ by the first equation, which in return requires η3(x) , ⊥
by the second equation; by transitivity η1(x) = η3(x)(, ⊥).
(2) If η1(x) = ⊥, the first equation requires that η2(x) = ⊥, which makes η3(x) = ⊥,
therefore both η1(x) = η3(x)(= ⊥).
erefore η1(x) = η3(x).

Lemma A.15. If η =lO
Γ
η′ then for each P ∈P, η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′.
Proof. ∀x ∈ dom(Γ), we need to prove that when πP (Γ)(x) ≤ lO then η(x) = η
′(x). But
πP (Γ)(x) = πP (Γ(x)) = t(P), from the definition of η(x) = η
′(x), the conclusion holds. 
Definition A.16. Let S be a system, and let FD, FT and Θ be its function declaration table, func-
tion type table, and permission assignments. We say S is well-typed iff for every function A. f ,
⊢ FD(A. f ) : FT (A. f ) is derivable.
Lemma A.17. If p ∈ P , then η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′ iff η =lO
πP (Γ↑p )
η′.
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Proof. We first note that dom(πP (Γ)) = dom(πP (Γ ↑p )) since both promotion and projection do
not change the domain of a typing environment. We then show below that πP (Γ) = πP (Γ ↑p ), from
which the lemma follows immediately. Given any x ∈ dom(πP (Γ ↑p )), for any Q ∈P, we have
πP (Γ ↑p )(x)(Q)
= (πP (Γ ↑p (x)))(Q) by Def.A.12
= (Γ ↑p (x))(P) by Def. A.10
= Γ(x)(P ∪ {p}) by Def. A.7
= Γ(x)(P) by assumption p ∈ P
= (πP (Γ(x)))(Q) by Def. A.10
= πP (Γ)(x)(Q) by Def. A.12
Since this holds for arbitrary Q ,it follows that πP (Γ ↑p ) = πP (Γ). 
Lemma A.18. If p < P , then η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′ ⇐⇒ η =
lO
πP (Γ↓p )
η′.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma A.17. 
Lemma A.19. Suppose Γ ⊢ e : t . For P ∈ P, if t(P) ≤ lO and η =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′, η ⊢ e { v and
η′ ⊢ e { v ′, then v = v ′.
Proof. Consider any P which satisfies t(P) ≤ lO and η =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′. e proof proceeds by induc-
tion on the derivation of Γ;A ⊢ e : t .
T-VAR We have Γ ⊢ x : Γ(x) = t . Since t(P) ≤ lO and η =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′, it is deducible that v = η(x) =
η′(x) = v ′.
T-OP We have
Γ ⊢ e1 : t Γ ⊢ e2 : t
Γ ⊢ e1 op e2 : t
and
η ⊢ ei { vi
η ⊢ e1 op e2 { v1 op v2
η′ ⊢ ei { v
′
i
η′ ⊢ e1 op e2 { v
′
1 op v
′
2
By induction on ei , we can get vi = v
′
i . erefore v = v
′.
T-SUBe we have
Γ ⊢ e : s s ≤ t
Γ ⊢ e : t
since s(P) ≤ t(P) and t(P) ≤ lO , then s(P) ≤ lO as well, thus the result follows by induction
on Γ ⊢ e : s .

Lemma A.20. Suppose Γ;A ⊢ c : t . en for any P ∈P, if t(P)  lO and η;A; P ⊢ c { η′, then
η =πP (Γ) η
′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ;A ⊢ c : t , with subinduction on the derivation of
η;A; P ⊢ c { η′.
T-ASS In this case t = Γ(x) and the typing derivation has the form:
Γ ⊢ e : Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := e : Γ(x)
and the evaluation under η takes the form:
η ⊢ v
η;A; P ⊢ x := e { η[x 7→ v]
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at is, η′ = η[x 7→ v]. So η and η′ differ possibly only in the mapping of x . Since
Γ(x)(P) = t(P)  lO , that is πP (Γ)(x)  lˆO , the difference in the valuation of x is not
observable at level lO . It then follows from Definition A.13 that η =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′.
T-CALL In this case the command c has the form x := call B. f (e) and the typing derivation takes
the form:
FT (B. f ) = s → s ′ Γ ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(s) πΘ(A)(s
′) ≤ Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
and we have that t = Γ(x). e evaluation under η is derived as follows:
FD(B. f ) = B. f (y)
{
init r = 0 in {c1; return r }
}
η ⊢ e { v [y 7→ v, r 7→ 0];B;Θ(A) ⊢ c1 { η1
η;A; P ⊢ x := call B. f (e) { η[x 7→ η1(r )]
Since t(P)  lO and Γ(x) = t , we have Γ(x)(P)  lO and therefore Γ(x)  lO and
η =
lO
πP (Γ)
η[x 7→ v ′] = η′.
T-IF is follows straightforwardly from the induction hypothesis.
T-WHILE We look at the case where the condition of the while loop evaluates to true, otherwise
it is trivial. In this case the typing derivation is
Γ ⊢ e : t Γ;A ⊢ c : t
Γ;A ⊢ while e do c : t
and the evaluation derivation is
η ⊢ e { v v , 0 η;A; P ⊢ c { η1
η1;A; P ⊢ while e do c { η
′
η;A; P ⊢ while e do c { η′
Applying the induction hypothesis (on typing derivation) and the inner induction hypoth-
esis (on the evaluation derivation) we get η =lO
πP (Γ)
η1 and η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′; by transitivity of
=
lO
πP (Γ)
we get η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′.
T-SEQ is case follows from the induction hypothesis and transitivity of the indistinguishability
relation.
T-LETVAR is follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that we can choose fresh
variables for local variables, and that the local variables are not visible outside the scope
of letvar.
T-CP We have:
Γ ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1 Γ ↓p ;A ⊢ c2 : t2 t = t1 ⊲p t2
Γ;A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : t
ere are two possible derivations for the evaluation. In one case, we have
p ∈ P η;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′
η;A; P ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 { η
′
Since t(P)  lO andp ∈ P , by Definiton A.11, we have t1(P)  lO . By induction hypothesis,
we have η =lO
πP (Γ↑p )
η′, by Lemma A.17, we have η =lO
πP (Γ)
η′.
e case where p < P can be handled similarly, making use of Lemma A.18.
T-SUBc Straightforward by induction.

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Definition A.21. A commandc executed in appA is said to be noninterferent iff. for allη1,η
′
1, Γ, P, lO ,
if
• η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′1,
• η1;A; P ⊢ c { η2 and
• η′1;A; P ⊢ c { η
′
2,
then η2 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′2.
Lemma A.22. Suppose Γ;A ⊢ c : t , for any P ∈ P, if η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′1, η1;A; P ⊢ c { η2, and
η′1;A; P ⊢ c { η
′
2, then η2 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′2.
Proof. eproof proceeds by induction on r(c), with subinduction on the derivations of Γ;Θ;A ⊢
c : t and η1;Θ; P ;A ⊢ c { η2. In the following, we shall omit the superscript lO from =
lO
πP (Γ)
to
simplify presentation.
T-ASS In this case, c ≡ x := e and the typing derivation takes the form:
Γ ⊢ e : Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := e : Γ(x)
where t = Γ(x), and suppose the two executions of c are derived as follows:
η1 ⊢ e { v
η1;A; P ⊢ x := e { η1[x 7→ v1]
η2 ⊢ e { v
′
η′1;A; P ⊢ x := e { η
′
1[x 7→ v2]
where η2 = η1[x 7→ v] and η
′
2 = η
′
1[x 7→ v
′]. Note that if Γ(x)  lO then η2 =πP (Γ) η
′
2 holds
trivially by Definition A.21. So let us assume Γ(x) ≤ lO . en applying Lemma A.19 to
η1 ⊢ e { v and η
′
1 ⊢ e { v
′ we get v = v ′, so it then follows that η2 =πP (Γ) η
′
2.
T-IF In this case c ≡ if e then c1 else c2 and we have
Γ ⊢ e : t Γ;A ⊢ c1 : t Γ;A ⊢ c2 : t
Γ;A ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 : t
If t(P)  lO , then the lemma follows easily from Lemma A.20. So we assume t(P) ≤ lO .
e evaluation derivation under η1 takes either one of the following forms:
η1 ⊢ e { v v , 0 η1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η2
η1;A; P ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 { η2
η1 ⊢ e { v v = 0 η1;A; P ⊢ c2 { η2
η;A; P ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 { η2
We consider here only the case where v , 0; the case with v = 0 can be dealt with
similarly. We first need to show that the evaluation of c under η′1 would take the same
if-branch. at is, suppose η′1 ⊢ e { v
′. Since t(P) ≤ lO , we can apply Lemma A.19 to
conclude that v = v ′ 6= 0, hence the evaluation of c under η′1 takes the form:
η′1 ⊢ e { v
′ v ′ , 0 η′1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′
2
η′1;A; P ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 { η
′
2
e lemma then follows straightforwardly from the induction hypothesis.
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T-WHILE c ≡ while e do cb and we have
Γ ⊢ e : t Γ;A ⊢ c : t
Γ;A ⊢ while e do c : t
If t(P)  lO , the conclusion holds by Lemma A.20. Otherwise, since η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′1, by
Lemma A.19, if η1 ⊢ e { v and η
′
1 ⊢ e { v
′ then v = v ′. If both are 0 then the conclusion
holds according to (E-WHILE-F). Otherwise, we have
η1 ⊢ e { v v , 0 η1;A; P ⊢ cb { η3
η3;A; P ⊢ while e do cb { η2
η;A; P ⊢ while e do cb { η2
η′1 ⊢ e { v v
′
, 0 η′1;A; P ⊢ cb { η
′
3
η′3;A; P ⊢ while e do cb { η
′
2
η;A; P ⊢ while e do cb { η
′
2
Applying the induction hypothesis to Γ;A ⊢ c : t , η1;A; P ⊢ cb { η3 and η
′
1;A; P ⊢ cb {
η′3, we obtain η3 =πP (Γ) η
′
3. en applying the inner induction hypothesis to η3;A; P ⊢
while e do cb { η2 and η
′
3;A; P ⊢ while e do cb { η
′
2, we obtain η2 =π(Γ)P η
′
2.
T-SEQ In this case we have c ≡ c1; c2 and Γ;A ⊢ c : t . If t(P)  lO , it is a direct conclusion from
Lemma A.20; otherwise it holds by induction on c1 and c2.
T-LETVAR In this case we have c ≡ letvar x = e in cb . If t(P)  lO then the lemma follows from
Lemma A.20. Otherwise, this case follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that
the mapping for the local variable x is removed in η2 and η
′
2.
T-CALL In this case, c has the form x := call B. f (e). Suppose the typing derivation is the follow-
ing (where we label the premises for ease of reference later):
FT (B. f ) = s → s ′
(T1) Γ ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(s) (T2) πΘ(A)(s
′) ≤ Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
where t = Γ(x), and the executions under η1 and η
′
1 are derived, respectively, as follows:
(E1) η1 ⊢ e { v1
(E2) [y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0];B;Θ(A) ⊢ c1 { η3
η1;A; P ⊢ x := call B. f (e) { η1[x 7→ η3(r )]
and
(E′
1
) η′1 ⊢ e { v2
(E′
2
) [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0];B;Θ(A) ⊢ c1 { η
′
3
η′1;A; P ⊢ x := call B. f (e) { η
′
1[x 7→ η
′
3(r )]
where FD(B. f ) = B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c1; return r }
}
, η2 = η1[x 7→ η3(r )] and η
′
2 =
η′1[x 7→ η
′
3(r )].
Moreover, since we consider only well-typed systems, the function FD(B. f ) is also ty-
pable:
(T3) [y : s, r : s
′];B ⊢ c1 : s
Θ ⊢ B. f (y)
{
init r = 0 in {c1; return r }
}
: s → s ′
First we note that if t(P)  lO then the result follows from LemmaA.20. So in the following,
we assume t(P) ≤ lO . Since t = Γ(x), it follows that Γ(x)(P) ≤ lO .
Let Γ′ = πΘ(A)([y : t , r : s]). We first prove several claims:
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• Claim 1: [y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0] =Γ′ [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0].
Proof: Let ρ = [y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0] and ρ
′
= [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0]. We need only to
check that the two mapping agrees on mappings of y that are of type ≤ lO . Suppose
Γ
′(yu ) = u ≤ lO and suppose ρ(yu ) = vu and ρ
′(yu ) = v
′
u for some yu ∈ y. From (E1)
we have η1 ⊢ eu { vu and from (E2) we have η
′
1 ⊢ eu { v
′
u , and from (T1) we have
Γ ⊢ eu : u. Since u ≤ lO , applying Lemma A.19, we get vu = v
′
u .
• Claim 2: η3 =Γ′ η
′
3.
Proof: From Claim 1, we know that
[y 7→ v1, r 7→ 0] =Γ′ [y 7→ v2, r 7→ 0].
Since r(c1) < r(c), we can apply the outer induction hypothesis to (E2), (E
′
2
) and (T3)
to obtain η3 =Γ′ η
′
3.
• Claim 3: η3(r ) = η
′
3(r ).
Proof: We first note that from (T2) and the assumption that Γ(x)(P) ≤ lO , we get
(πΘ(A)(s
′))(P) ≤ lO . e laer, by Definition A.10, implies that s
′(Θ(A)) ≤ lO . Since
r ∈ dom(Γ′), it is obvious that Γ′ ⊢ r : s ′, η3 ⊢ r { η3(r ) and η
′
3 ⊢ r { η
′
3(r ). From
Claim 2 above, we have η3 =Γ′ η
′
3. erefore by Lemma A.19, we have η3(r ) = η
′
3(r ).
e statement we are trying to prove, i.e., η2 =πP (Γ) η
′
2, follows immediately from Claim 3
above.
T-CP c ≡ test(p) c1 else c2 and we have
Γ ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1 Γ ↓p ;A ⊢ c2 : t2 t = t1 ⊲p t2
Γ;A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : t
We need to consider two cases, one where p ∈ P and the other where p < P .
Assume that p ∈ P . en the evaluation of c under η1 and η
′
1 are respectively:
p ∈ P η1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η2
η1;A; P ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 { η2
and
p ∈ P η′1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η
′
2
η′1;A; P ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 { η
′
2
Since η1 =πP (Γ) η
′
1 and since p ∈ P , by Lemma A.17, we have η1 =πP (Γ↑p ) η
′
1. erefore by
the induction hypothesis applied to Γ ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1, η1;A; P ⊢ c1 { η2 and η
′
1;A; P ⊢ c1 {
η′2, we obtain η2 =πP (Γ↑p ) η
′
2, and by Lemma A.17, we get η2 =πP (Γ) η
′
2.
For the case where p < P , we apply a similar reasoning as above, but using Lemma A.18
in place of Lemma A.17.

Definition A.23. Let S be a system. A function
A. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
in S with FT (A. f ) = t → t ′ is noninterferent if for all η1,η
′
1, P,v, lO , if the following hold:
• t(P) ≤ lO ,
• η1 =
lO
πP (Γ)
η′1, where Γ = [x : t , r : t
′],
• η1;A; P ⊢ c { η2, and
• η′1;A; P ⊢ c { η
′
2,
then η2(r ) = η
′
2(r ). e system S is noninterferent iff all functions in S are noninterferent.
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Theorem A.24. Well-typed systems are noninterferent.
Proof. Follows from Lemma A.22. 
B TYPE INFERENCE
Definition B.1. Given a base type t and a permission trace Λ, the application of Λ on t , denoted
as t · Λ, is defined as follows:
t · Λ =

t if Λ = ϵ
(t ↑p ) · Λ
′ if ∃p,Λ′.(Λ = ⊕p :: Λ′)
(t ↓p ) · Λ
′ if ∃p,Λ′.(Λ = ⊖p :: Λ′)
Definition B.2. e partial subtyping relation ≤Λ, which is the subtyping relation applied on the
permission trace, is defined as s ≤Λ t iff. s · Λ ≤ t · Λ.
Lemma B.3. ∀s, t ∈ T , s ≤ t =⇒ s ≤Λ t .
Proof. By induction on len(Λ).
• Λ = ϵ . Since s · Λ = s and t · Λ = t , the conclusion holds trivially.
• Λ = ⊕p :: Λ′ or Λ = ⊖p :: Λ′. Assume it is the former case, the laer is similar. By the
hypothesis and Lemma A.9, s ↑p≤ t ↑p . en by induction, s ↑p ·Λ
′ ≤ t ↑p ·Λ
′, that is,
s · Λ ≤ t · Λ.

Lemma B.4. ∀t ∈ T , p,q ∈ P s.t. p , q , t · (⊚p ⊛ q) = t · (⊛q ⊚ p), where ⊚,⊛, ∈ {⊕, ⊖}.
Proof. We only prove t · (⊖p ⊕q) = t · (⊕q ⊖p), the other cases are similar. Consider any P ∈P,
t · (⊖p ⊕ q)(P) = ((t ↓p ) ↑q )(P)
= (t ↓p (P ∪ {q}))
= t((P ∪ {q}) \ {p})
and
t · (⊕q ⊖ p)(P) = ((t ↑q) ↓p )(P)
= t((P \ {p}) ∪ {q})
= t((P ∪ {q}) \ ({p} \ {q}))
= t((P ∪ {q}) \ {p})
erefore, t · (⊖p ⊕ q) = t · (⊕q ⊖ p). 
Lemma B.5. ∀t ∈ T ,(t ·⊚p) · Λ = (t · Λ) ·⊚p, ⊚ ∈ {⊕, ⊖} and p < Λ.
Proof. By induction on len(Λ). e conclusion holds when len(Λ) = 0 and len(Λ) = 1 by
Lemma B.4. Suppose len(Λ) > 1, there exists Λ′ and q such that Λ = ⊛q :: Λ′ where ⊛ ∈ {⊕, ⊖}.
(t ·⊚p) · Λ
= ((t ·⊚p) ·⊛q) · Λ′ (by Definition B.1)
= (t · (⊚p ⊛ q)) · Λ′ (by Definition B.1)
= (t · (⊛q ⊚ p)) · Λ′ (by Lemma B.4)
= ((t ·⊛q) ·⊚p) · Λ′ (by Definition B.1)
= ((t ·⊛q) · Λ′) ·⊚p (induction hypothesis)
= (t · (⊛q :: Λ′)) ·⊚p (by Definition B.1)
= (t · Λ) ·⊚p

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Lemma B.6. ∀t ∈ T , p ∈ P,(t ·⊚p) ·⊛p = t · (⊚p), where ⊚,⊛ ∈ {⊕, ⊖}.
Proof. By case analysis.
• ((t · ⊕p) · ⊕p)(P) = t(P ∪ {p} ∪ {p}) = t(P ∪ {p}) = t · (⊕p) for each P ∈P.
• ((t · ⊕p) · ⊖p)(P) = t((P \ {p}) ∪ {p}) = t(P ∪ {p}) = t · (⊕p) for each P ∈P.
• ((t · ⊖p) · ⊕p)(P) = t((P ∪ {p}) \ {p}) = t(P \ {p}) = t · (⊖p) for each P ∈P.
• ((t · ⊖p) · ⊖p)(P) = t((P \ {p}) \ {p}) = t(P \ {p}) = t · (⊖p) for each P ∈P.

Lemma B.7. ∀t ∈ T , (t · Λ) · Λ = t · Λ.
Proof. By induction on len(Λ). e conclusion holds trivially for len(Λ) = 0 and for len(Λ) = 1
by Lemma B.6 . When len(Λ) > 1, without loss of generality, assume Λ = ⊕p :: Λ′.
t · Λ · Λ
= (t · (⊕p · Λ′)) · (⊕p :: Λ′)
= (t · (Λ′ · ⊕p)) · (⊕p :: Λ′) (by Lemma B.5)
= (((t · Λ′) · ⊕p) · ⊕p) · Λ′ (by Definition B.1)
= ((t · Λ′) · ⊕p) · Λ′ (by Lemma B.6)
= ((t · ⊕p) · Λ′) · Λ′ (by Lemma B.5)
= (t · ⊕p) · Λ′ (induction hypothesis)
= t · (⊕p :: Λ′) (by Definition B.1)
= t · Λ

Lemma B.8. ∀s, t ∈ T . ∀p ∈ P.(s ⊲p t) · Λ = (s · Λ) ⊲p (t · Λ), where p < Λ.
Proof. By induction on len(Λ).
len(Λ) = 0: Trivially.
len(Λ) > 0: In this case we have Λ = Λ′ :: ⊕q or Λ′ :: ⊖q, where len(Λ′) ≥ 0, p < Λ′, q , p. We
only prove Λ′ :: ⊕q, the other case is similar. Consider any P , we have
((s ⊲p t) · (Λ
′ :: ⊕q))(P)
= ((s ⊲p t) · Λ
′)(P ∪ {q})
= ((s · Λ′) ⊲p (t · Λ
′))(P ∪ {q}) (By induction)
=
{
(s · Λ′)(P ∪ {q}) p ∈ P
(t · Λ′)(P ∪ {q}) p < P
=
{
(s · (Λ′ :: ⊕q))(P) p ∈ P
(t · (Λ′ :: ⊕q))(P) p < P
= ((s · (Λ′ :: ⊕q)) ⊲p (t · (Λ
′ :: ⊕q)))(P)

Lemma B.9. ∀s, t ∈ T . ∀p ∈ P. s ≤ t ⇔ s · ⊕p ≤ t · ⊕p and s · ⊖p ≤ t · ⊖p.
Proof. (⇒) by applying Lemma B.3 with Λ = ⊕p and Λ = ⊖p respectively.
(⇐) ∀P ∈P,
(1) If p ∈ P , by Lemma A.8(a), s(P) = (s ↑p )(P) = (s · ⊕p)(P) and t(P) = (t ↑p )(P) = (t · ⊕p)(P),
since s · ⊕p ≤ t · ⊕p, then s(P) ≤ t(P).
(2) If p < P , by Lemma A.8(b), s(P) = (s ↓p )(P) = (s · ⊖p)(P) and t(P) = (t ↓p )(P) = (t · ⊖p)(P),
since s · ⊖p ≤ t · ⊖p, then s(P) ≤ t(P).
is indicates that s ≤ t . 
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Lemma B.10. Let Λ be the permission trace collected from the context of e or c .
(a) If Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t , then Γ · Λ ⊢ e : (t · Λ).
(b) If Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : t , then (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : (t · Λ).
(c) If ⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ t ′, then ⊢ B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
:
t −→ t ′.
Proof. e proof of (a), by induction on Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t .
TT-VAR Trivially.
TT-OP In this case we have e  e1 op e2 and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢t e1 : t1 Γ;Λ ⊢t e2 : t2
Γ;Λ ⊢t e1 op e2 : t1 ⊔ t2
By induction on ei , we can get Γ · Λ ⊢ ei : (ti · Λ). By Lemma B.3 and ti ≤ t1 ⊔ t2, we have
ti ·Λ ≤ (t1 ⊔ t2) ·Λ. By subsumption, we have Γ ·Λ ⊢ ei : ((t1 ⊔ t2) ·Λ). Finally, by applying
Rule (T-OP), we get Γ · Λ ⊢ e1 op e2 : ((t1 ⊔ t2) · Λ).
e proof of (b):
TT-ASS In this case we have c  x := e and the following derivation
(T1) Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t (T2) t ≤Λ Γ(x)
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t x := e : Γ(x)
By (a) on (T1), Γ · Λ ⊢ e : (t · Λ). From (T2), we get t · Λ ≤ (Γ · Λ)(x). So by subsumption,
Γ · Λ ⊢ e : (Γ · Λ)(x). Finally, by Rule (T-ASS), the result follows.
TT-LETVAR In this case we have c  letvar x = e in c ′ and the following derivation
(T1) Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s (T2) s ≤Λ s
′
(T3) Γ[x : s
′];Λ;A ⊢t c
′ : t
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t letvar x = e in c
′ : t
By (a) on (T1), Γ · Λ ⊢ e : (s · Λ). From (T2), we get s · Λ ≤ s
′ · Λ. So by subsumption,
Γ · Λ ⊢ e : s ′ · Λ. By induction on (T3), we have (Γ[x : s
′] · Λ);A ⊢ c ′ : t · Λ, that is
(Γ · Λ)[x : s ′ · Λ];A ⊢ c ′ : t · Λ. Finally, by Rule (T-LETVAR), the result follows.
TT-IF By induction and Rules (T-SUBc ), (T-IF).
TT-WHILE By induction and Rules (T-SUBc ), (T-WHILE).
TT-SEQ By induction and Rules (T-SUBc ), (T-SEQ).
TT-CALL In this case we have c  x := call B. f (e) and the following derivation
(T1) FT (B. f ) = t −→ t
′ (T2) Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s
(T3) s ≤Λ πΘ(A)(t) (T4) πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤Λ Γ(x)
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
By (c) on (T1), ⊢ B. f : t −→ t
′. By (a) on (T2) , Γ · Λ ⊢ e : s · Λ. From (T3), we get
s · Λ ≤ (app(t ,Θ(A)) · Λ) = app(t ,Θ(A)). So by subsumption, Γ · Λ ⊢ e : app(t ,Θ(A)).
Similarly, from (T4), we get app(t
′,Θ(A)) ≤ (Γ · Λ)(x). en by Rule (T-ASS), (Γ · Λ);A ⊢
x := call B. f (e) : (Γ · Λ)(x).
TT-CP In this case we have c  test(p) c1 else c2 and the following derivation
Γ;Λ :: ⊕p;A ⊢t c1 : t1 Γ;Λ :: ⊖p;A ⊢t c2 : t2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t test(p) c1 else c2 : t1 ⊲p t2
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By induction on ci , we have
(Γ · (Λ :: ⊕p));A ⊢ c1 : (t1 · (Λ :: ⊕p))
(Γ · (Λ :: ⊖p));A ⊢ c2 : (t2 · (Λ :: ⊖p))
which is equivalent to
(Γ · Λ) ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : (t1 · Λ) ↑p
(Γ · Λ) ↓p ;A ⊢ c2 : (t2 · Λ) ↓p
Let t ′ be (t1 · Λ) ↑p ⊲p (t2 · Λ) ↓p . By Rule (T-CP), we have
(Γ · Λ);A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : t
′.
Since Λ is collected from the context of c and there are no nested checks of p, we have
p < Λ. Let’s consider any P . If p ∈ P , then
t ′(P) = (t1 · Λ) ↑p (P) (p ∈ P)
= (t1 · Λ)(P) (Lemma A.8)
= ((t1 · Λ) ⊲p (t2 · Λ))(P) (p ∈ P)
= ((t1 ⊲p t2) · Λ)(P) (Lemma B.8)
Similarly, if p < P , t ′(P) = ((t1 ⊲p t2) ·Λ)(P). erefore, t
′
= (t1 ⊲p t2) ·Λ and thus the result
follows.
e proof of (c) :
Clearly, we have
[x : t , r : t ′]; ϵ ;B ⊢t c : s
⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ t ′
Applying (b) on c , [x : t , r : t ′];B ⊢ c : s . Finally, by Rule (T-FUN), the result follows. 
Lemma B.11. Let Λ be the permission trace collected from the context of e or c .
(a) If Γ ⊢ e : t , then (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : (t · Λ)
(b) If Γ;A ⊢ c : t , then (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : (t · Λ).
Proof. e proof of (a) : by induction on Γ ⊢ e : t .
T-VAR Trivially.
T-OP In this case we have e  e1 op e2 and the following derivation
Γ ⊢ e1 : t Γ ⊢ e2 : t
Γ ⊢ e1 op e2 : t
By induction on ei , (Γ · Λ) ⊢ ei : (t ·Λ). By Rule (T-OP), we have (Γ ·Λ) ⊢t e1 op e2 : (t ·Λ).
T-SUBe In this case we have the following derivation
(T1) Γ ⊢ e : s (T2) s ≤ t
Γ ⊢ e : t
By induction on (T1), (Γ · Λ) ⊢t e : (s · Λ). From (T2) and Lemma B.3, we get s · Λ ≤ t · Λ.
So by subsumption, the result follows.
e proof of (b): by induction on Γ;A ⊢ c : t .
T-ASS In this case we have c  x := e and the following derivation
Γ ⊢ e : Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := e : Γ(x)
By (a) on e , (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : (Γ · Λ)(x). en by Rule (T-ASS), the result follows.
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T-LETVAR In this case we have c  letvar x = e in c ′ and the following derivation
Γ ⊢ e : s Γ[x : s];A ⊢ c ′ : t
Γ;A ⊢ letvar x = e in c ′ : t
By (a) on e , (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : (s · Λ). By induction on c , ((Γ[x : s]) · Λ);A ⊢ c ′ : (t · Λ), that is
(Γ · Λ)[x : s · Λ];A ⊢ c ′ : (t · Λ). en by Rule (T-LETVAR), the result follows.
T-IF By induction and Rule (T-IF).
T-WHILE By induction and Rule (T-WHILE).
T-SEQ By induction and Rule (T-SEQ).
T-CALL in this case we have c  x := call B. f (e) and the following derivation
FT (B. f ) = t −→ t ′
(T1) Γ ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(t) (T2) πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤ Γ(x)
Γ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
By (a) on (T1), (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(t) · Λ, that is, (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(t). From (T2) and
Lemma B.3, πΘ(A)(t
′) ·Λ ≤ (Γ ·Λ)(x), that is, πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤ (Γ ·Λ)(x). en by Rule (T-CALL),
(Γ · Λ);A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : (Γ · Λ)(x).
T-CP In this case we have c  test(p) c1 else c2 and the following derivation
Γ ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1 Γ ↓p ;A ⊢ c2 : t2
Γ;A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : t1 ⊲p t2
By induction on c1 and c2, we have
((Γ ↑p ) · Λ);A ⊢ c1 : t1 · Λ ((Γ ↓p ) · Λ);A ⊢ c2 : t2 · Λ
Since Λ is collected from the context of c and there are no nested checks of p, we have
p < Λ. By Lemma B.5, (Γ ↑p ) · Λ = (Γ · Λ) ↑p and (Γ ↓p ) · Λ = (Γ · Λ) ↓p . en by Rule
(T-CP), we have
(Γ · Λ);A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : (t1 · Λ) ⊲p (t2 · Λ).
Finally, by Lemma B.8, (t1 ⊲p t2) · Λ = (t1 · Λ) ⊲p (t2 · Λ), and thus the result follows.
T-SUBc In this case we have the following derivation
(T1) Γ;A ⊢ c : s (T2) t ≤ s
Γ;A ⊢ c : t
By induction on (T1), (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : (s · Λ). From (T2) and by Lemma B.3, t · Λ ≤ s · Λ.
en by subsumption, the result follows.

Lemma B.12. Let Λ be the permission trace collected from the context of e or c .
(a) If Γ · Λ ⊢ e : t , then (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : (t · Λ)
(b) If (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : t , then (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : (t · Λ).
Proof. By Lemma B.11 and Lemma B.7. 
Lemma B.13. Let Λ be the permission trace collected from the context of e or c .
(a) If Γ · Λ ⊢ e : t · Λ, then there exists s such that Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s and s ≤Λ t .
(b) If (Γ · Λ);A ⊢ c : t · Λ, then there exists s such that Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : s and t ≤Λ s .
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(c) If ⊢ B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ s , then ⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
:
t −→ s .
Proof. e proof of (a) : by induction on Γ · Λ ⊢ e : t · Λ.
T-VAR Trivially with s = Γ(x).
T-OP In this case we have e  e1 op e2 and the following derivation
Γ · Λ ⊢ e1 : t · Λ Γ · Λ ⊢ e2 : t · Λ
Γ · Λ ⊢ e1 op e2 : t · Λ
By induction on ei , there exists si such that Γ;Λ ⊢t ei : si and si ≤Λ t . By Rule (TT-OP),
we have Γ;Λ ⊢t e1 op e2 : s1 ⊔ s2. Moreover, it is clear that s1 ⊔ s2 ≤Λ t . erefore, the
result follows.
T-SUBe In this case we have the following derivation
(T1) Γ · Λ ⊢ e : s (T2) s ≤ t · Λ
Γ · Λ ⊢ e : t · Λ
Applying Lemma B.12 on (T1), Γ ·Λ ⊢ e : s ·Λ. en by induction, there exists s ′ such that
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s
′ and s ′ ≤Λ s . From (T2) and Lemma B.7, we can get s
′ ≤Λ t · Λ ≤Λ t . us the
result follows.
e proof of (b): by induction on Γ · Λ;A ⊢ c : t · Λ.
T-ASS In this case we have c  x := e and the following derivation
(Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : (Γ · Λ)(x)
(Γ · Λ);A ⊢ x := e : (Γ · Λ)(x)
By (a) on e , there exists s such that Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s and s ≤Λ Γ(x). en by Rule (TT-ASS),
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t x := e : Γ(x).
T-LETVAR In this case we have c  letvar x = e in c ′ and the following derivation
(T1) (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : s (T2) (Γ · Λ)[x : s];A ⊢ c
′ : t · Λ
(Γ · Λ);A ⊢ letvar x = e in c ′ : t · Λ
Applying Lemma B.12 on (T1), (Γ · Λ) ⊢ e : s · Λ. en by (a), there exists s
′ such that
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s
′ and s ′ ≤Λ s . Applying Lemma B.11 on (T2), ((Γ ·Λ)[x : s]) ·Λ;A ⊢ c
′ : (t ·Λ) ·Λ.
And by Lemma B.7, we have (Γ[x : s] · Λ);A ⊢ c ′ : (t · Λ). en by induction, there exists
t ′ such that Γ[x : s];Λ;A ⊢t c
′ : t ′ and t ≤Λ t
′. Finally, by Rule (TT-LETVAR), we have
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t letvar x = e in c
′ : t ′.
T-IF By induction and Rule (TT-IF).
T-WHILE By induction and Rule (TT-WHILE).
T-SEQ By induction and Rule (TT-SEQ).
T-CALL In this case we have c  x := call B. f (e) and the following derivation
FT (B. f ) = tp −→ tr (T1) Γ · Λ ⊢ e : πΘ(A)(tp )
(T2) πΘ(A)(tr ) ≤ (Γ · Λ)(x)
Γ · Λ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x) · Λ
From (T1), we have Γ · Λ ⊢t e : (πΘ(A)(tp ) · Λ). en by (a), there exists te such that
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : te and te ≤Λ πΘ(A)(tp ). From (T2), we have πΘ(A)(tr ) ≤Λ Γ(x). en by Rule
(TT-CALL), Γ;Λ;A ⊢ x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x).
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T-CP In this case we have c  test(p) c1 else c2 and the following derivatioin
(Γ · Λ) ↑p ;A ⊢ c1 : t1 (Γ · Λ) ↓p ;A ⊢ c2 : t2
(Γ · Λ);A ⊢ test(p) c1 else c2 : t · Λ
where t · Λ = t1 ⊲p t2.
Clearly, (Γ · Λ) ↑p= Γ · (Λ :: ⊕p) and (Γ · Λ) ↓p= Γ · (Λ :: ⊖p). Applying Lemma B.12 on
c1 and c2 with Λ :: ⊕p and Λ :: ⊖p respectively, we have
(Γ · (Λ :: ⊕p));A ⊢ c1 : t1 · (Λ :: ⊕p)
(Γ · (Λ :: ⊖p));A ⊢ c2 : t2 · (Λ :: ⊖p)
By induction, there exist s1 and s2 such that
Γ; (Λ :: ⊕p);A ⊢t c1 : s1 t1 ≤Λ::⊕p s1
Γ; (Λ :: ⊖p);A ⊢t c2 : s2 t2 ≤Λ::⊖p s2
en by Rule (TT-CP), we have
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t test(p) c1 else c2 : s1 ⊲p s2.
e remaining is to prove t · Λ ≤ (s1 ⊲p s2) · Λ. Since Λ is collected from the context of c
and there are no nested checks of p, we have p < Λ. Consider any P . If p ∈ P , then
((s1 ⊲p s2) · Λ)(P)
= ((s1 · Λ) ⊲p (s2 · Λ))(P) (Lemma B.8)
= (s1 · Λ)(P) (p ∈ P)
= (s1 · (Λ :: ⊕p))(P) (Lemma A.8)
≥ (t1 · (Λ :: ⊕p))(P) (t1 ≤Λ::⊕p s1)
= (t1 · Λ)(P) (Lemma A.8)
= ((t1 · Λ) ⊲p (t2 · Λ))(P) (p ∈ P)
= ((t1 ⊲p t2) · Λ)(P) (Lemma B.8)
= ((t · Λ) · Λ)(P)
= (t · Λ)(P) (Lemma B.7)
Similarly, if p < P , we also have (t ·Λ)(P) ≤ ((s1 ⊲p s2) ·Λ)(P). erefore, the result follows.
T-SUBc In this case we have the following derivation
(T1) Γ · Λ;A ⊢ c : s (T2) t · Λ ≤ s
Γ · Λ;A ⊢ c : t · Λ
Applying Lemma B.12 on (T1), Γ · Λ;A ⊢ c : s · Λ. en by induction, there exists s ′ such
that Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : s
′ and s ≤Λ s
′. From (T2) and by Lemma B.3, we can get t ≤Λ s ≤Λ s
′.
us the result follows.
e proof of (c):
Clearly, we have
[x : t , r : t ′];B ⊢ c : s
⊢ B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ t ′
By (b) on c , there exists tb such that [x : t , r : t
′];B ⊢t c : tb and s ≤ tb . By Rule (TT-FUN),
⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: t −→ t ′

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Definition B.14. Given a constraint setC and a substitution θ , we say θ is a solution ofC , denoted
as θ  C , iff. for each (Λ, L ≤ R) ∈ C , Lθ ≤Λ Rθ holds.
Lemma B.15. (a) If Γ;Λ ⊢д e : t { C and θ  C , then Γθ ;Λ ⊢t e : tθ .
(b) If Γ;Λ;A ⊢д c : t { C and θ  C , then Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t c : tθ .
(c) If ⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: α −→ β { C and θ  C , then ⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
:
θ (α) −→ θ (β).
Proof. e proof of (a): by induction on the derivation of Γ;Λ ⊢д e : t { C .
TG-VAR: In this case we have the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢д x : Γ(x){ ∅
Clearly, for any θ , θ  ∅. By Rule (TT-VAR), we have
Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t x : Γθ (x)
TG-OP In this case we have e  e1 op e2 and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢д e1 : t1 { C1 Γ;Λ ⊢д e2 : t2 { C2
Γ;Λ ⊢д e1 op e2 : t1 ⊔ t2 { C1 ∪C2
Since θ  C1 ∪C2, θ  C1 and θ  C2. en by induction on ei , Γθ ;Λ ⊢t ei : tiθ . So by Rule
(TT-OP), we have Γθ ;Λ ⊢t e1 op e2 : t1θ ⊔ t2θ . Clearly, t1θ ⊔ t2θ = (t1 ⊔ t2)θ .
e proof of (b):
TG-ASS In this case we have c  x := e and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢д e : t { Ce
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д x := e : Γ(x){ Ce ∪ {(Λ, t ≤ Γ(x))}
Since θ  Ce ∪ {(Λ, t ≤ Γ(x))}, θ  Ce and tθ ≤Λ Γ(x)θ . By (a) on e , Γθ ;Λ ⊢t e : tθ . By
Rule (TT-ASS), Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t x := e : Γθ (x).
TG-LETVAR In this case we have c  letvar x = e in c ′ and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢д e : s { C1 Γ[x : α];Λ;A ⊢д c
′ : t { C2
C = C1 ∪C2 ∪ {(Λ, s ≤ α)}
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д letvar x = e in c : t { C
Since θ  C , θ  C1, θ  C2, and sθ ≤Λ θ (α). By (a) on e , Γθ ;Λ ⊢t e : sθ . By induction on c
′,
Γθ [x : θ (α)];Λ;A ⊢t c
′ : tθ . Finally, by Rule (TT-LETVAR), Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t letvar x = e in c :
tθ .
TG-CALL In this case we have c  x := call B. f (e) and the following derivation
FTC (B. f ) = (t −→ t
′,Cf )
Γ;Λ ⊢д e : s {
⋃
Ce
Ca = {(Λ, s ≤ πΘ(A)(t)), (Λ, πΘ(A)(t
′) ≤ Γ(x))}
C = Cf ∪
⋃
Ce ∪Ca
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x){ C
Since θ  C , then θ  Cf , θ  Ce , sθ ≤Λ πΘ(A)(tθ ), and πΘ(A)(t
′θ) ≤Λ Γθ (x)). By (c) on B. f ,
we have
⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: tθ −→ t ′θ
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that is, FT (B. f ) = tθ −→ t ′θ . By (a) on e ,
Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t e : sθ .
Finally, by Rule (TT-CALL),
Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t x := call B. f (e) : Γθ (x)
TG-CP In this case we have c  test(p) c1 else c2 and the following derivation
Γ;Λ :: ⊕p;A ⊢д c1 : t1 { C1
Γ;Λ :: ⊖p;A ⊢д c2 : t2 { C2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢д test(p) c1 else c2 : t1 ⊲p t2 { C1 ∪C2
Since θ  C1 ∪C2, then θ  C1 and θ  C2. By induction on c1 and c2, we get
Γθ ; (Λ :: ⊕p);A ⊢t c1 : t1θ
Γθ ; (Λ :: ⊖p);A ⊢t c2 : t2θ
By Rule (TT-CP), we have
Γθ ;Λ;A ⊢t test(p) c1 else c2 : t1θ ⊲p t2θ
Moreover, it is clear that (t1 ⊲p t2)θ = (t1θ ) ⊲p (t2θ ).
others By induction.
e proof of (c):
[x : α , r : β]; ϵ ;B ⊢д c : s { C
⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: α −→ β { C
Since θ  C , by (b) on c , we have
[x : θ (α), r : θ (β)]; ϵ ;B ⊢t c : sθ
Finally, by Rule (TT-FUN), we get
⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: θ (α) −→ θ (β)

Lemma B.16. (a) If Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t , then there exist Γ
′, t ′,C, θ such that Γ′;Λ ⊢д e : t
′
{ C ,
θ  C , Γ′θ = Γ and t ′θ = t .
(b) If Γ;Λ;A ⊢t c : t , then there exist Γ
′, t ′,C, θ such that Γ′;Λ;A ⊢д c : t
′
{ C , θ  C , Γ′θ = Γ
and t ′θ = t .
(c) If ⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: tp −→ tr , then there exist α , β,C, θ such that
⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: α −→ β { C,
θ  C , and (α −→ β)θ = tp −→ tr , where α , β are fresh type variables.
Proof. e proof of (a): Let Γ0 = {x 7→ αx | x ∈ dom(Γ)} and θ0 = {αx 7→ Γ(x) | x ∈ dom(Γ)},
where αx s are fresh type variables. Clearly, we have Γ0θ0 = Γ. e remaining is to prove that
∃C, t ′. Γ0;Λ ⊢д e : t
′
{ C, θ0  C and t
′θ0 = t (1’)
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TT-VAR In this case we have e  x and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢t x : Γ(x)
By Rule (TG-VAR), we have
Γ0;Λ ⊢д x : Γ0(x){ ∅
Clearly, θ0  ∅ and Γ0θ0(x) = Γ(x).
TT-OP In this case we have e  e1 op e2 and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢t e1 : t1 Γ;Λ ⊢t e2 : t2
Γ;Λ ⊢t e1 op e2 : t1 ⊔ t2
By induction on ei , there exist Ci , t
′
i such that
Γ0;Λ ⊢д ei : t
′
i { Ci θ0  Ci t
′
i θ0 = ti .
By Rule (TG-OP), we have
Γ0;Λ ⊢д e1 op e2 : t
′
1 ⊔ t
′
2 { C1 ∪C2.
Moreover, it is clear that θ0  C1 ∪C2 and (t
′
1 ⊔ t
′
2)θ0 = t1 ⊔ t2.
e proof of (b). Let Γ0 = {x 7→ αx | x ∈ dom(Γ)} and θ0 = {αx 7→ Γ(x) | x ∈ dom(Γ)}, where αx s
are fresh type variables. Clearly, we have Γ0θ0 = Γ. Assume that different parameters of different
functions have different names. Let V1 ♯ V2 denote V1 ∩ V2 = ∅. In the remaining we prove the
following statement:
∃C, t ′, θ . Γ0;Λ;A ⊢д c : t
′
{ C, dom(θ0) ♯ dom(θ ),
θ0 ∪ θ  C, and t
′(θ0 ∪ θ ) = t (2’)
TT-ASS In this case we have c  x := e and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : t t ≤Λ Γ(x)
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t x := e : Γ(x)
By (1′) on e , there exist C, t ′ such that Γ0;Λ ⊢д e : t
′
{ C , θ0  C and t
′θ0 = t . By Rule
(TG-ASS), we get
Γ0;Λ;A ⊢д x := e : Γ0(x){ C ∪ {(Λ, t
′ ≤ Γ0(x))}.
Take θ = ∅. Since t ′θ0 = t ≤Λ Γ(x) = Γ0θ0(x), then θ0  {(Λ, t
′ ≤ Γ0(x))}, and thus
θ0  C ∪ {(Λ, t
′ ≤ Γ0(x))}.
TT-LETVAR In this case we have c  letvar x = e in c ′ and the following derivation
Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s Γ[x : s
′];Λ;A ⊢t c
′ : t s ≤Λ s
′
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t letvar x = e in c
′ : t
By (1′) on e , there exist Ce , se such that Γ0;Λ ⊢д e : se { Ce , θ0  Ce and seθ0 = s .
Let Γ′0 = Γ0[x : αx ] and θ
′
0 = θ0 ∪ {αx 7→ s
′}, where αx is fresh. By induction on c
′,
there exist C ′, t ′, θ such that Γ′0 ;Λ;A ⊢д c
′ : t ′ { C ′, dom(θ ′0) ♯ dom(θ ), θ
′
0 ∪ θ  C
′, and
t ′(θ ′0 ∪ θ ) = t .
By Rule (TG-LETVAR), we have
Γ0;Λ;A ⊢д letvar x = e in c : t
′
{ C
whereC = Ce∪C
′∪{(Λ, se ≤ αx )}. Let θ
′
= θ∪{αx 7→ s
′}. It is clear thatdom(θ0) ♯ dom(θ
′)
and θ0 ∪ θ
′
= θ ′0 ∪ θ . From the construction of θ
′ (i.e., the proof of (2′) and (3′)), the type
variables in dom(θ ′) are collected from the types of the functions and (local) variables,
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which are fresh. So we also have θ0 ∪ θ
′  Ce and Γ0(θ0 ∪ θ
′) = Γ0θ0 = Γ. Moreover,
se (θ0 ∪ θ
′) = seθ0 = s ≤Λ s
′
= αx (θ0 ∪ θ
′). erefore, θ0 ∪ θ
′  C .
TT-CALL In this case we have c  x := call B. f (e) and the following derivation
FT (B. f ) = tp −→ tr Γ;Λ ⊢t e : s
s ≤Λ πΘ(A)(tp ) πΘ(A)(tr ) ≤Λ Γ(x)
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t x := call B. f (e) : Γ(x)
By (c) on B.f, there exist α , β,Cf , θf such that ⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
:
α −→ β { Cf , θf  Cf and (α −→ β)θf = tp −→ tr . So we have FTC (B. f ) = (α −→ β,Cf ).
Since αx s are fresh, we can safely get dom(θ0) ♯ dom(θf ). erefore, θ0 ∪ θf  Cf and
(α −→ β)(θ0 ∪ θf ) = tp −→ tr .
By (1′) on e , there exist s ′,Ce such that Γ0;Λ;A ⊢д e : s ′ { Ce , θ0  Ce , and s ′(θ0) = s .
From the construction of θf (i.e., the proof of (2
′) and (3′)), the type variables in dom(θf )
are collected from the types of functions and (local) variables, which are fresh. So we also
have θ0 ∪ θf  C, s ′(θ0 ∪ θf ) = s and Γ0(θ0 ∪ θf ) = Γ.
By Rule (TG-CALL), we have
Γ0;Λ;A ⊢д x := call B. f (e) : Γ0(x){ C
where C = Cf ∪
⋃
C ∪ C ′ and C ′ = {(Λ, s ′ ≤ πΘ(A)(α)), (Λ, πΘ(A)(β)) ≤ Γ0(x))}. Since
dom(θf ) are fresh, we have
s ′(θ0 ∪ θf ) = s ≤Λ πΘ(A)(tp ) = πΘ(A)(α(θ0 ∪ θf ))
and
πΘ(A)(β(θ0 ∪ θf )) = πΘ(A)(tr ) ≤Λ Γ(x) = Γ0(θ0 ∪ θf )(x)
So (θ0 ∪ θf )  C
′, and thus (θ0 ∪ θf )  C . Moreover, we also have (Γ0(x))(θ0 ∪ θf ) = Γ(x).
us the result follows.
TT-CP In this case we have c  test(p) c1 else c2 and the following derivation
Γ;Λ :: ⊕p;A ⊢t c1 : t1 Γ;Λ :: ⊖p;A ⊢t c2 : t2
Γ;Λ;A ⊢t test(p) c1 else c2 : t1 ⊲p t2
By induction on ci , we have
∃C1, s1, θ1. Γ0;Λ :: ⊕p;A ⊢д c1 : s1 { C1, θ0 ∪ θ1  C1,
dom(θ0)♯dom(θ1) and s1(θ0 ∪ θ1) = t1
∃C2, s2, θ2. Γ0;Λ :: ⊖p;A ⊢д c2 : s2 { C2, θ0 ∪ θ2  C2,
dom(θ0)♯dom(θ2) and s2(θ0 ∪ θ2) = t2
By Rule (TG-CP), we get
Γ0;Λ;A ⊢д test(p) c1 else c2 : s1 ⊲p s2 { C1 ∪C2
From the construction of θ1 and θ2 (i.e., the proof of (2
′) and (3′)), the type variables in
dom(θ1) and dom(θ2) are collected from the types of functions and (local) variables, which
are fresh. Moreover, if θ1∩θ2 , ∅, that is, they share some functions, then θ1(αx ) = θ2(αx )
for all αx ∈ dom(θ1)∩dom(θ2). So we can safely get (θ0∪θ1∪θ2)  Ci and si (θ0∪θ1∪θ2) = ti ,
and Γ0(θ0∪θ1∪θ2) = Γ. erefore, (θ0∪θ1∪θ2)  C1∪C2 and (s1 ⊲p s2)(θ0∪θ1∪θ2) = t1 ⊲p t2.
others By induction.
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e proof of (c):
[x : tp , r : tr ]; ϵ ;B ⊢t c : s
⊢t B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: tp −→ tr
Let Γ0 = {x 7→ α , r 7→ β} and θ0 = {α 7→ tp , β 7→ tr }, where α , β are fresh. By (2
′) on c , we have
∃t ,Cf , θ . Γ0; ϵ ;B ⊢д c : t { Cf , (θ0 ∪ θ
′)  Cf ,
dom(θ0) ♯ dom(θ ) and t(θ0 ∪ θ
′) = s .
By Rule (TG-FUN), we have
⊢д B. f (x)
{
init r = 0 in {c; return r }
}
: α −→ β { Cf
Finally, it is clear that (α −→ β)(θ0 ∪ θ
′) = tp −→ tr . 
Lemma B.17. Given two types s, t and a permission trace Λ, then s ≤ t ⇐⇒ s · Λ ≤ t · Λ and
∀Λ
′ ∈ dnf (¬Λ). s · Λ′ ≤ t · Λ′.
Proof. Generalized from Lemma B.9. 
Lemma B.18. If C {r C
′, then C  C ′ and C ′  C , where r ∈ {d, s,m}.
Proof. By case analysis.
CD-CUP, CD-CAP Trivial.
CD-MERGE By Lemma B.9.
CD-LAPP, CD-RAPP By definition of projection.
CD-SVAR, CD-SUB0, CD-SUB1 Trivial.
CS-LU It is clear that C ∪ C ′  C . For the other direction, we only need to prove {(Λ1, t1 ≤
Λr ,α), (Λl ,α ≤ Λ2, t2)}  {(Λ1 ∧ Λ
′
r , t1 ≤ Λ2 ∧ Λ
′
l
, t2)}, where Λ
′
l
= (Λl ∧ Λr ) − Λr ,
Λ
′
r = (Λl ∧ Λr ) − Λl and ∆(Λl ∧ Λr ). Assume that θ  {(Λ1, t1 ≤ Λr ,α), (Λl ,α ≤ Λ2, t2)},
that is,
(t1θ ) · Λ1 ≤ θ (α) · Λl θ (α) · Λr ≤ (t2θ ) · Λ2
Since ∆(Λl ∧ Λr ), by Lemmas B.3 and B.4, we have
(t1θ ) · Λ1 ∧ Λ
′
r ≤ θ (α) · Λl ∧ Λr θ (α) · Λl ∧ Λr ≤ (t2θ ) · Λ2 ∧ Λ
′
l
which deduces
(t1θ ) · Λ1 ∧ Λ
′
r ≤ (t2θ ) · Λ2 ∧ Λ
′
l
that is, θ  {(Λ1 ∧ Λ
′
r , t1 ≤ Λ2 ∧ Λ
′
l
, t2)}.
CM-GLP
θ  {(Λi , ti ≤ Λir ,α)}i ∈I
⇐⇒∀i ∈ I . ( (tiθ ) · Λi ≤ θ (α) · Λir )
⇐⇒∀I ′ ⊆ I . ∀Λ ∈ ϕ(I ′). ∀i ∈ I ′.
((tiθ ) · (Λi ∧ (Λ − Λir )) ≤ θ (α) · Λ) (Lemma B.17)
⇐⇒∀I ′ ⊆ I . ∀Λ ∈ ϕ(I ′).
( ⊔i ∈I ′(tiθ ) · (Λi ∧ (Λ − Λir )) ≤ θ (α) · Λ )
⇐⇒θ  {(ϵ, t⊔I ′,Λ ≤ Λ,α)}I ′⊆I,Λ∈ϕ (I ′)
CM-LUB Similar to (CM-GLP).
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CM-BDS Similar to (CM-GLP).
CM-SBD Trivial.

Lemma B.19. If uni f y(E) = θ , then θ  E.
Proof. By induction on |E |.
|E | = 0 Trivial.
|E | > 0 In this case we have E = {(Λi ,α) = ti }i ∈I :: E
′, where O(α) is the greatest. Let tα
be the type constructed from (Λi , ti ) and E
′′ be the equation set obtained by replacing
in E ′ every occurrence of α by tα . Assume uni f y(E
′′) = θ ′, then θ = θ ′ ∪ {α 7→ tα }.
By induction, we have θ ′  E ′′. By construction, it is clear that θ  {α 7→ tα }. Let’s
consider the constraints {(Λi , β) = si }i ∈I ∈ E
′ of any other variable β . en we have
{(Λi , β) = si {α 7→ tα }}i ∈I ∈ E
′′.
θ (β) · Λi = θ
′(β) · Λi (Apply θ )
= (si {α 7→ tα })θ
′ (θ ′  E ′′)
= si (θ
′ ∪ {α 7→ tα })

Lemma B.20. If θ  E, then there exist θ ′ and θ ′′ such that uni f y(E) = θ ′ and θ = θ ′θ ′′.
Proof. Conclusion holds trivially when |E | = 0].
When |E | > 0, we have E = {(Λi ,α) = ti }i ∈I :: E
′, where O(α) is the greatest. Let tα be the type
constructed from (Λi , ti ) and E0 be the equation set obtained by replacing in E
′ every occurrence
of α by tα . Since σ  E, we also have σ  E
′ and thus σ  E0. By induction on E0, there exist θ
′
0
such thatuni f y(E0) = θ
′
0 and θ = θ
′
0θ . According to unify(), we getuni f y(E) = θ
′
0∪{α 7→ tα } = θ
′.
For any β < dom(θ ′), clearly β(θ ′θ ) = βθ . For α , α(θ ′θ ) = (tα )θ = αθ , since θ  E. While for any
other variable β ∈ dom(θ ′), we have
β(θ ′θ ) = β((θ ′0 ∪ {α 7→ tα })θ ) = β(θ
′
0θ ) = βθ

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